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Varieties of Constitutional Experience: 
Democracy and the Marriage Equality  
Campaign
Nan D. Hunter
AbstRACt
Beginning in the 1970s, the overwhelming success of anti-gay ballot questions made 
direct democracy the most powerful bête noire of the LGBT rights movement.  It is 
thus deeply ironic that, more than any other factor, an electoral politics-style campaign 
led to the national mandate for marriage equality announced by the Supreme Court in 
Obergefell v. Hodges.  This occurred because marriage equality advocates set out to change 
social and constitutional meanings not primarily through courts or legislatures, but with 
a strategy designed to win over moveable middle voters in ballot question elections. 
Successful pro-gay litigation arguments, followed by supportive reasoning in judicial 
victories, grew directly out of the messaging frames that tested best with voters.  A new 
variation on popular constitutionalism was born. 
The lawyers who led the marriage equality campaign succeeded by decentering litigation 
until after opinion polls registered majority support for allowing same-sex marriage.  In 
developing and implementing this strategy, they were assisted by professionals skilled 
in communications research and enabled by large-scale, coordinated funding.  These 
dimensions of the marriage equality effort both validate and contradict much of the law 
and society scholarship predicting that court-centered rights discourse will inevitably 
dominate law reform campaigns.
In this Article, I argue that the same-sex marriage campaign is likely to foreshadow 
sophisticated social change efforts in the future that look less like traditional impact 
litigation strategies and more like social marketing campaigns, one component of which 
may be constitutional interpretation.  Whether this model has major potential for 
significantly progressive change will turn on its effectiveness for issues that involve claims 
for redistribution of material resources or greater openness in governance, challenges 
with which the marriage equality effort was not forced to engage.
In the marriage campaign, voter-tested messaging led to two major discursive innovations. 
The first was the jettisoning of rights arguments in favor of storytelling models that 
were grounded in emotions rather than rights.  Advocates stopped enumerating the 
legal benefits of marriage and talked more about the bonds of commitment exemplified 
by same-sex couples.  Second, ballot question campaign ads increasingly featured the 
construction of a storytelling arc centered on how opposition to same-sex marriage of 
older or more conservative voters could morph into acceptance (even if not endorsement) 
of it.  These narratives guided conflicted, moveable middle voters (and others) along a 
path toward a different sense of moral awareness about homosexuality and same-sex 
marriage than the manichean version of morality arguments used by conservatives.  The 
new approaches were calibrated, tested, and refined for particular audiences, producing 
empirical evidence to support a new addition to the language of law: data-driven 
arguments.
The most significant limitations of this approach operated at the level of social and 
constitutional meanings.  Several discursive pivot points that emerged from the 
messaging strategy led to the shrinkage of what might have been greater emphasis on 
the pluralism of family forms as the foundation for equality and liberty in the realm of 
personal relationships.  These pivot points include:
•	 The	shift	from	an	equality	frame	based	on	analogies	to	other	social	minorities	
to a universalized sameness approach;
•	 The	 shift	 from	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	material	 consequences	 of	 being	 denied	
access to the legal incidents of marriage to an emphasis on commitment, child raising, 
and the relational and emotional motivations for wanting to marry; and
•	 The	avoidance	of	arguments	 for	“expanding”	or	“changing”	marriage	and	the	
stress	of	the	desire	for	“joining”	marriage.
This new frame reassured moderate voters and judges that the traditional norms and 
practices associated with marriage were not being threatened, producing a kind of cultural 
interest conversion.  This was brought about through a discourse that was mined from the 
rhetoric of popular constitutionalism but suffused with the resonance of respectability.
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Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no 
constitution, no law, no court can . . . do much to help it.  While it lies 
there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it. 
—Judge Learned Hand1 
If you are among the many Americans—of whatever sexual orienta-
tion—who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate 
today’s decision. . . .  But do not celebrate the Constitution.  It had 
nothing to do with it. 
—Chief Justice Roberts2 
INTRODUCTION 
The inescapable tension at the heart of constitutionalism in a democracy is 
the endlessly contested border between law and politics.  The legal realists ex-
ploded the myth that the two occupy pristinely distinct spheres, but scholars con-
tinue to debate whether and how contingent concepts such as liberty and equal 
protection can endure as both principled over time and relevant in the moment.  
Without precedent and reason, there can be no reliable rule of law.  Yet without a 
robust and ingrained appreciation of liberty and equality among citizens, the rule 
of law is an empty formalism. 
Constitutional change emerges from a process involving multiple actors 
inside and outside the formal legal arenas of courts and legislatures.  Social 
movements produce change in the law.  Even originalists accommodate interpre-
tations of the U.S. Constitution that emerge over time.  And so the debate con-
tinues over the proper role of judges, legislators, and the people themselves in 
fashioning and refashioning the meaning of the Constitution. 
No contemporary issue has elevated questions of law and politics quite like 
the question of whether same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marriage.  
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges3 was preceded by 
massive social contestation outside of courts and legislatures, almost all of it 
involving social movements.  The content of the arguments centered on moral 
  
1. LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES 
OF LEARNED HAND 189, 190 (Irving Dillard ed., 1952). 
2. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
3. 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
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and political questions that were frequently debated in electoral arenas, but were 
often framed in constitutional terms. 
The story of the LGBT rights campaign illustrates that the influence of 
elections on minority rights is not limited to the direct substantive effect of 
changes in law nor to the results of litigation.  To a greater extent than is known 
or understood, the campaign for marriage equality was shaped most powerfully 
by electoral politics, rather than by litigation or legislative battles.  Most accounts 
begin with a mid-1990s court decision in Hawaii4 that provided the rationale for 
Republicans to force enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act (DoMA),5 under 
which the federal government refused to recognize same-sex marriages as valid 
under state law.  The end came with two Supreme Court decisions: the first in 
2013 ruling that DoMA was unconstitutional6 and the second, two years later, 
mandating that same-sex couples be allowed to marry in every state.7  In many 
ways, however, ballot questions had a greater influence on the campaign.  What 
constitutes ordinary politics may not have a precise definition, but it surely 
includes election campaigns.  Ballot questions, which are distinctive only in that 
the contestants are proposals to amend statutory or constitutional text rather than 
candidates, powerfully merge law and politics.  At least as much as through legis-
lative representation, direct democracy mechanisms profoundly influence the 
framing and social meaning of such concepts as rights, equality and fairness. 
What was unique about the LGBT rights/marriage equality movement 
was that a definitive Supreme Court victory resulted from a campaign that 
de-emphasized litigation for most of its duration and was dominated until the 
final two years by ballot questions, most of which were forced by opponents.  
Advocates reconfigured the terms of debate in these ballot question elections 
based on opinion research results gleaned from average voters, and the messaging 
aimed at voters then formed the basis for non-electoral communication strate-
gies, including the development of frames that ultimately entered the judicial 
arena. 
This Article uses the same-sex marriage movement to examine contemporary 
social movement dynamics and the theories and mechanisms of constitutional 
change.  It analyzes how the LGBT rights movement developed an innovative 
strategy for shaping legal discourse that sheds new light on the workings of what I 
  
4. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), aff’d, 950 P.2d 
1234 (Haw. 1997), remanded from Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
5. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as amended at 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2012)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
6. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
7. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
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call polycentric constitutionalism, that is, the multiplicity of institutions, social 
practices, and specific bodies of knowledge that contribute to constitutional 
meaning.  The strategy involved creating a campaign—essentially a national po-
litical campaign without a candidate—within a social movement. 
Judges do not simplistically follow elections or public opinion polls, but they 
do not need to.  They are seldom out of sync with public sentiment for an extended 
period of time because shifts in opinion and partisan dominance are embedded in 
the judicial selection process.  However divisive and bitter, the partisan calculus of 
judicial appointments has locked together more tightly the political philosophy of 
federal judges with that of the executive branch and, to a lesser extent, the dominant 
views in Congress.  There are occasional deviations from the party line among the 
Justices, just as there are among members of Congress across the street, but they 
are rare.  And the rankly partisan nature of the judicial appointments process has 
normalized the sense that one of the ways in which elections will have conse-
quences will be the outcome of constitutional interpretation on highly divisive 
issues. 
This Article addresses both the impact of social movements on law and the 
impact of law on social movements.  These influences operate in a feedback loop, 
and at the center of this recursive process with regard to same-sex marriage were 
anti-gay ballot questions.  Their centrality to both sides eventually melded 
LGBT rights discourse with the discourse of popular constitutionalism in ways 
and to an extent that is unique in the history of civil rights movements. 
Both sides in this contest rejected a durable border between law and politics 
and relied on its absence in their formulation of strategy.  Conservative claims 
about gay rights became part of the Republican Party’s use of cultural politics to 
grow its base.  As part of their strategy to win a definitive marriage equality decision 
from the Supreme Court, lesbian and gay rights advocates learned that success in 
changing the law required winning elections.  Because of the repeated ballot 
questions initiated by conservatives, often amendments to state constitutions, 
LGBT advocates had no choice but to compete in the electoral arena over 
questions of constitutional interpretation. 
The marriage equality debate began as a struggle between two identity 
groups: lesbians and gay men on one side and religious conservatives on the other, 
both supported by their strongest allies.  Each side began with a core cluster of 
arguments which it later modified.  In the 1990s, conservatives supplemented 
their original morality-based claims with their own version of a secular rights 
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argument based on the “no special rights” trope,8 which handily mapped onto 
white backlash against civil rights protections for persons of color.  Roughly a 
dozen years later, LGBT rights lawyers moved in the opposite direction and sys-
tematically de-emphasized rights claims in favor of emotive appeals wrapped in 
narrative. 
Based on their experience in ballot question elections, marriage equality 
advocates built a new model for law-oriented social movements.  The new strategy 
combined universalizing, rather than minoritizing, rhetoric with the technology 
and knowledges of national political campaigns.  In the process, these advocates 
invented a form of public policy marketing that is poised to recur across the ideo-
logical spectrum and with regard to many different issues.  The rhetorical foun-
dation for the new organizational model was a legal and cultural argument built 
on sameness, positioning same-sex couples in ways that sought respect based on 
respectability. 
The discursive strategy became assimilation in and through law, based on 
the convergence of cultural interests.  Following signals from Justice Kennedy, 
their only possible fifth vote on the Court, marriage equality advocates eventually 
elevated sameness arguments over civil rights analogy-based reasoning, and 
developed a secular morality argument for those voters (and judges) in the movable 
middle, who hesitated to align themselves with either liberal pro-gay or sectarian 
anti-gay positions.9  Working with communications experts, advocates created 
messages that accommodated the conflicted emotions of their target audiences 
and modeled paths to acceptance of same-sex marriage.  In effect, these messages 
redefined what it meant to be a good person, not only for the stigmatized gay 
outsider but also for the heterosexual majority decisionmakers.10 
What began as a conflict within the terms of identity group politics evolved 
and expanded beyond the two minorities.  A new cultural détente on accommo-
dating homosexuality emerged with seemingly little disruption of 
heteronormativity, though perhaps with significant diminishment in the authority 
  
8. See ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL 
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 155–58 (2005). 
9. For Kennedy’s vital position on the Court in the context of same-sex marriage, see Emma Green, 
Gay Marriage Is Now a Constitutional Right in the United States of America, ATLANTIC (June 26, 
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/gay-marriage-legal-in-the-united-
states-of-america/396947/ [https://perma.cc/U9WC-WUGR], which notes that Justice Kennedy 
“has long been seen as the possible swing vote on gay marriage.”  For a discussion on the sameness 
argument, see infra Part IV.A.  For a discussion on the meaning of morality in the LGBT rights 
context, see infra Part I.B. 
10. See infra notes 246–247 and accompanying text. 
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of organized religion to enforce traditional beliefs regarding sexuality.11  The legal 
precedent that was established ended an exclusion, but it may provide little if any 
support for future claims that would require denaturalizing gender and disrupting 
patterns of sexualized racial oppression—two names for continuing hierarchies of 
subordination that marriage equality advocates dared not speak.12 
In addition, the marriage equality campaign developed a new model for social 
movements in several respects.  Structurally, the new model produced a hybrid 
organization geared to winning elections as well as law reform; strategically, its 
primary investment was in communications research and social marketing tech-
niques; and politically, its discursive priority was in emphasizing how a minority 
group’s norms and values were the same as those of the majority.  These innova-
tions, while successful in achieving nationwide marriage equality, likely will limit 
or channel the portability of the model into some social movements but not others. 
The overall effort to legalize same-sex marriage produced a complex effort 
of many moving parts.  This Article focuses on one important 
underacknowledged component.13  In Part I, I describe how voting on ballot 
questions played an extraordinarily significant role in the contestation over the 
social meanings of morality and equality in the campaigns for and against LBGT 
rights, far greater than in any other social movement in the United States.  Popular 
votes on antidiscrimination and relationship recognition laws began in the mid-
1970s and continue today.  After the Supreme Court invalidated a form of ballot 
  
11. Between 2007 and 2014, the percentage of Americans who self-identified as Christian dropped 
from 78.4 percent to 70.6 percent, and the proportion of “unaffiliated” increased from 16.1 percent 
to 22.8 percent.  America’s Changing Religious Landscape, PEW RES. CTR. (May 12, 2015), http:// 
www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/#factors-behind-the-
changes-in-americans-religious-identification [https://perma.cc/434T-C4ZU].  Although one 
cannot connect this development directly to debates over same-sex marriage, the correlation is 
strong.  Disaffiliation reflects an increasing degree of popular distance from the sources of the 
strongest institutional opposition to marriage equality.  The degree of religiosity has been strongly 
predictive of negative views about same-sex marriage.  MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE 
CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE 170 (2013).  Moreover, the youngest age cohorts were both some of the  likliest to 
support same-sex marriage and to be unaffiliated with faith groups.  Id. at 199–200; America’s 
Changing Religious Landscape, supra. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 274–276. 
13. With all that has been written about direct democracy and separately about the constitutionality of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, it is remarkable that relatively little legal scholarship has 
been published about the intersection of the two, given the important role that ballot questions 
have played on this issue.  The same can be said about the intersection of social movements and 
elections. Doug McAdam & Sidney Tarrow, Ballots and Barricades: On the Reciprocal Relationship 
Between Elections and Social Movements, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 529, 532 (2010).  In this Article, I 
address the interactions between election results and litigation related to the same issues, and thus 
hope to contribute to filling these gaps in the literature on law and social movements. 
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measure designed to block expansion of civil rights coverage to sexual orienta-
tion, the focus of conservatives turned to same-sex marriage. 
Part II examines the new structure created by LGBT rights advocates to 
respond to the repeated losses on the marriage question.  A leadership group 
consisting mostly of lawyers and legal organizations created a national political 
campaign model geared (increasingly over time)  to winning elections.  Lawyer 
dominance in the new structure and the implementation process of the groups’ 
strategy are consistent with critiques of law-oriented social movement organiza-
tions, but the marriage equality example contradicts the assumption in much of 
the literature that the product of such dominance will necessarily have a 
juricentric focus.14  As a refinement of the existing critiques, I offer a five-point 
framework for assessing the structure and efficacy of social movement organiza-
tions that are frankly law-oriented.  The five items in this metric address traditional 
questions of accountability and also accommodate new forms such as the quasi-
political campaign mode. 
Part III turns to issues of political discourse and social meaning, specifically 
how the framing of claims and the tropes of argumentation differ depending on 
context and what the consequences are of those differences.  Again, I focus on the 
interplay between popular elections and broader message strategies.  Both sides 
innovated in this realm.  Conservatives invented the “special” rights versus “equal” 
rights trope, not in courts, nor in legislatures, but in ballot question campaigns.15  
Seeking a non-moralistic argument to expand support beyond a religious base, 
they created a trope that moved from the state to the federal level and from pam-
phlets to briefs to judicial text.  Pro-equality advocates moved from abstract to 
emotive arguments.  Building on sophisticated communications research, they 
refined campaign messages into narratives that illuminated a path for conflicted 
voters toward making peace with the existence of same-sex marriage. 
Part IV follows this process into litigation and the substance of law.  
Marriage equality advocates inserted election-tested themes into their briefs and 
arguments.  Three pivot points emerged: prioritizing arguments based on sameness 
over analogies to minority rights; using commitment and children as symbols to 
support these sameness claims; and invoking a desire to join rather than change 
marriage.  Together, these rhetorical devices provided marriage equality advo-
cates with the ability to shift between universalizing and minoritizing discourses 
and to selectively invoke sameness or difference.  They grew out of popular 
  
14. Gwendolyn M. Leachman, From Protest to Perry: How Litigation Shaped the LGBT Movement’s 
Agenda, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1667, 1685–87 (2014). 
15. See ANDERSEN, supra note 8, at 211. 
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discourse and proved extraordinarily successful before judicial audiences.  One of 
the prices paid for such nimbleness, however, was the sacrifice of the full potential 
of equality arguments (at least in the abstract).  This narrower scope of equality 
principles, in turn, left the suggestion of an affinity with raced respectability in its 
wake.16 
Part V examines more deeply whether the marriage equality campaign 
succeeded in changing culture as well as law.  I argue that marriage equality was 
achieved in large part because of interest convergence, which occurred in the cul-
tural rather than the more typical material realm.  The heterosexual majority had 
virtually nothing material at stake in the question of whether same-sex couples 
would be allowed to marry, and for LGBT persons, the issue was driven as much 
by a desire for social legitimation as tangible benefits.  What emerged was not a 
new set of practices or policies with significant economic ramifications or a revised 
allocation of resources for governance, but a modified cultural detante, a 
renorming of homosexuality. 
The ultimate outcome of the marriage equality campaign, of course, cannot 
be attributed solely to the effects of direct democracy or to the political campaign 
model that LGBT rights advocates created.  This Article examines only one 
dimension of the movement strategies and the broader political and social 
changes that led to the Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.17  I do not argue 
that the focus on ballot questions explains it all.  Yet, it is true and deeply ironic 
that without the interplay between law and politics—between elite and popular 
interpretations of the Constitution which characterize ballot question debates 
and bedevil LGBT advocates—marriage equality likely would have taken far 
longer to secure. 
Equality advocates recognized that marriage had its own “vocabulary,” 
containing a rich potential for claims of moral authority.18  This Article describes 
what occurred when the vocabulary of marriage intersected with the grammar of 
constitutionalism and the language of elections.  Using these components, 
advocates constructed a new kind of machine to drive the marriage equality 
campaign, and in so doing, reconfigured the process for social change. 
  
16. See infra text accompanying notes 274–276. 
17. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
18. See, e.g., EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: AMERICA, EQUALITY, AND GAY 
PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO MARRY 6 (2004) (“[M]arriage is now the vocabulary  we use to talk of love, 
family, dedication, self-sacrifice, and stages of life.  Marriage is a language of love, equality and 
inclusion.”); Evan Wolfson, Ten Years of Marriage, 10 Milestones to Celebrate: How We Got Here, 
PRIDE MAG., June 2014, at 52, 54. 
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I. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND LGBT RIGHTS 
Popular constitutionalism—the study of how non-judicial actors, including 
ordinary citizens, interpret the Constitution—seeks to bridge the gap between 
law and politics as “the mechanism that mediates between constitutional law and 
culture.”19  Constitutional meanings emerge over time as the products of a wide 
variety of social practices.  Judicial rulings add the power of the state to a particular 
interpretation in what is usually the most important and most visible point in the 
process.  Accepting the supremacy of the judiciary in interpreting the Constitu-
tion, however, does not preclude recognizing and crediting the impact of citizen 
interpretations.  The process of interpretation continues past the point of a court 
decision. 
The domain of popular discourse about constitutionalism overlaps with 
arenas for popular engagement with ordinary politics and for more formal 
processes of lawmaking, a kind of Venn diagram of modes of constitutional 
deliberation.  Many scholars have analyzed the extra-juridical effects of court 
decisions; in this Article, I examine the juridical effects of election campaigns, 
specifically how the language of elections can influence legal discourse and core 
concepts of constitutional law.  My focus is on ballot questions that pose issues of 
constitutional dimension for direct citizen consideration such as in this case of 
equal rights for LGBT Americans. 
At least in the abstract, ballot questions are “as near to a democracy as you 
can get.”20  They represent the most fully majoritarian of all methods of political 
decisionmaking, save perhaps town meetings.  Their deficits resound in pluralism 
rather than in democracy: the potential for harm to minorities, and the absence of 
procedural and structural devices to interrupt unreasoned, impulsive 
decisionmaking on emotional issues.21  These shortcomings operate in direct ten-
sion with the need for statesmanlike approaches to the management of intense 
values conflicts. 
  
19. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 983 (2004). 
20. This was said by Justice Hugo Black during the oral argument in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 
(1967).  See Oral Argument at 47:22, Reitman, 387 U.S. 369 (No. 483), https://www.oyez.org/ 
cases/1966/483 [https://perma.cc/8WHN-U9VV], quoted in Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of 
Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1506 (1990). 
21. See Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and Campaigns Against Minorities, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1730, 
1745–47 (2013); William N. Eskridge, Foreword: The Marriage Cases—Reversing the Burden of 
Inertia in a Pluralist Constitutional Democracy, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1785, 1843–51 (2009); Barbara 
S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 247–51 (1997). 
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LGBT rights have been the focus of ballot initiatives and referenda more 
than any other civil rights issue.22  As a result, the gap between applicability of 
antidiscrimination norms to sexual minorities has been a product of the electoral 
arena to a unique extent in the United States.  From the mid-1970s to 2009, voters 
in state and local elections have cast ballots almost one hundred and fifty times on 
some issue related to the rights of LGBT Americans.23  This amounts to more 
than half of the voter questions that the “Religious Right” sought to place on ballots 
during that period.24  On the marriage issue alone, citizens in thirty-six states 
have voted, sometimes more than once, on whether the law of marriage should 
exclude same-sex couples.25 
For almost all of this nearly fifty-year period, anti-equality forces won the 
great majority of gay-related ballot contests.  In three studies of anti-gay ballot 
measures through 2001, approximately 73 percent passed.26  The lopsided 
outcomes reinforced the minoritarian position of LGBT rights supporters and 
cemented the view that judicial rulings and legislative successes in favor of LGBT 
rights ran deeply counter to cultural norms.  The Supreme Court invalidated a 
state constitutional amendment that singled out LGBT rights laws as requiring a 
higher level of popular support for enactment, and thereby slowed, but did not 
end, the conservatives’ use of ballot questions.27  As demonstrated in this next 
Section, to win at the ballot box became the priority not just for LGBT groups 
generally, but for LGBT litigation and lobbying organizations as well. 
A. The Role of Direct Democracy in the LGBT Rights Movement 
The integration of direct democracy with representative government took 
hold in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, driven 
  
22. Gamble, supra note 21, at 257. 
23. AMY L. STONE, GAY RIGHTS AT THE BALLOT BOX, at xv (2012). 
24. See id. at 7 (reporting 31 percent of all ballot initiative attempts by the Religious Right during this 
time frame aimed to constrain or eliminate government support for LGBT persons and 25 percent 
of all ballot initiative attempts by the Religious Right involved reducing or repealing legal rights for 
same-sex couples). 
25. Craig M. Burnett & Mathew D. McCubbins, Marriage on the Ballot: An Analysis of Same-Sex 
Marriage Referendums in North Carolina, Minnesota, and Washington During the 2012 Elections, 19 
CHAP. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2016). 
26. STONE, supra note 23, at 4 (noting that “voters rejected LGBT rights in 70 percent” of 158 
referenda and initiatives); see also Gamble, supra note 21, at 253 tbl.1, 258 (noting that 79 percent of 
the forty-three initiatives to restrict LGBT rights were approved); Donald P. Haider-Markel & 
Kenneth J. Meier, Legislative Victory, Electoral Uncertainty: Explaining Outcomes in the Battles Over 
Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 20 REV. POL’Y RES. 671, 676 (2003) (noting that over 71 percent of 
ninety antigay initiatives and referenda were successful). 
27. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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by populist farmer and worker interests in states in the Western half of the 
nation.28  The trend for states to allow initiatives29 and referenda30 spread East, 
and today, they can be authorized to appear on the ballot in twenty-seven states.31  
However, some states limit their application to statutory rather than state-
constitutional revision, or require legislative clearance before issues are put before 
the voters,32 so the likelihood of their use varies significantly by location.33 
Beginning a few years before congressional adoption of comprehensive 
federal antidiscrimination law and in reaction to state and local civil rights gains 
by African Americans, the tactic of using methods of direct democracy to constrain 
advances in equality became a favored device for conservatives.  The questions 
most often put before voters during that time first appeared in 1959 with “a wave 
of ballot box assaults in the area of fair housing and public accommodation 
laws.”34  Using ballot questions to roll back advances for racial equality proved 
successful: Between 1963 and 1968, voters in California considered eleven 
referenda questions on fair housing law, one statewide and ten local, and adopted 
the anti-equality position in all but one.35 
When the constitutionality of these voter-adopted provisions came before 
it, the Supreme Court aligned the standard of review for ballot questions with the 
system of tiered review used to analyze legislative enactments.36  A closely divided 
Court invalidated a California constitutional amendment that had effectively re-
  
28. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, 
AND RECALL 48–52 (1989); see also Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 84–85 (Cal. 2009) (providing 
an overview of this history). 
29. Initiatives allow voters to propose a state statute or constitutional amendment by submitting 
petitions containing the requisite number of signatures.  CRONIN, supra note 28, at 2. 
30. Referenda allow voters to approve or reject a state statute or constitutional amendment that has 
already been enacted or endorsed by the state legislature.  Id. 
31. John G. Matsusaka, 2015 Ballot Provisions, in 48 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, BOOK OF THE 
STATES 307 (2016). 
32. INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., UNIV. OF S. CAL., COMPARISON OF STATEWIDE 
INITIATIVE PROCESSES 1, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/docs/A_Comparison_of_Statewide_I 
andR_Processes.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3Q2-5CSD]. 
33. Matsusaka, supra note 31, at 308. 
34. Gamble, supra note 21, at 255. 
35. CRONIN, supra note 28, at 94.  Derrick Bell described referenda as a “most effective” tactic to defeat 
efforts to achieve racial equality.  Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial 
Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1978). 
36. When referenda or initiatives drew distinctions based on race, the Court employed the same level 
of strict scrutiny as it applied to race-based classifications in statutes.  See Schuette v. Coal. to 
Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1632, 1634–35 (2014) (discussing racial 
discrimination in the context of initiatives and later noting that classification on the basis of race is 
“inherently suspect”).  When the distinction was facially neutral, did not specify a characteristic to 
which the Court applied heightened scrutiny, and was not the aim of a discriminatory purpose, the 
Court used a rational basis standard of review.  Id. at 1640, 1647 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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pealed an antidiscrimination law by creating a new right of any individual to rent 
or sell property to whomever he chose.37  The Court found that the amendment 
relied on coded language to perpetuate race discrimination in housing.  Two 
years later, in Hunter v. Erickson,38 the Court struck down an amendment to the 
Akron city charter that both prevented implementation of an ordinance barring 
race discrimination in housing and required that future antidiscrimination ordi-
nances be approved by popular vote as well as by the city council.39  The Hunter 
decision united what became the two wings of equal protection review for ballot 
questions: whether the measure singled out race for adverse treatment, and 
whether it established different and more difficult procedures for future legislative 
protections for racial minorities.40 
After Hunter, the Court became more open to arguments that ballot 
measures which imposed a disparate racial burden were nonetheless presumptively 
legitimate because of their facial neutrality.41  Nonetheless, the Court has not 
retreated from its determination that a provision’s adoption by popular vote does 
not immunize it from the same level of judicial review as measures adopted by a 
legislature.42  The Court thus disabled campaigns to establish or re-establish 
explicitly race-based classifications, but left ostensibly race-neutral measures in 
place.  In response, conservative deployment of race-related ballot question cam-
paigns shifted to issues such as affirmative action, where provisions impose dis-
criminatory effects but eschew explicit references to race. 
By the early 1990s, conservatives had begun to repeatedly use ballot questions 
to exclude sexual orientation protection from civil rights laws.  A study by Barbara 
Gamble of votes held on multiple topics related to minority rights from 1959 to 
1993 found that LGBT-related issues amounted to almost 60 percent of the 
total, by far the single most frequent basis.43  Another study of anti-gay initiatives 
and referenda found that  fifty-seven were put before voters at the state or local 
  
37. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
38. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
39. Id. 
40. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 470, 474 (1982). 
41. See, e.g., Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (ruling that an 
amendment to the Michigan Constitution prohibiting affirmative action in public education, 
employment, and contracting was constitutional); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) 
(affirming the constitutionality of an amendment to the California Constitution prohibiting state 
courts from ordering busing to achieve desegregation unless doing so would be required by federal 
Constitution); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding an amendment to the California 
Constitution requiring referenda on low-income housing projects). 
42. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) (“[V]oters may no 
more violate the Constituiton by enacting a ballot measure than a legislative body may do so by 
enacting legislation.”); Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392. 
43. Gamble, supra note 21, at 250, 257. 
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level between 1974 and 1996.  Of these, forty-five, or 77 percent, passed.44  This 
is similar to Gamble’s findings where of the forty-three ballot questions on an 
LGBT rights topic submitted for a vote during 1959 to 1993, 88 percent sought 
restrictions on rights and 79 percent of those prevailed.45 
The data on ballot questions closely tracks the history of the LGBT rights 
movement.  Starting in the mid-1970s, local elected bodies adopted or added 
antidiscrimination protections for sexual orientation to municipal codes, a devel-
opment that spread to state legislatures in the 1980s.46  LGBT rights advocates 
deployed arguments based on the themes of civil rights, equality, and privacy to 
secure these laws, and generally used conventional organizing and lobbying 
methods.47  Success in the municipal legislative realm in turn triggered the first 
referenda and initiatives, and launched the countermobilization on LGBT issues 
that became the seed of anti-gay campaigns with their emphasis on morality 
arguments.48 
During this period, popular votes on the rights of small, unpopular minorities 
operated in a kind of constitutional free-fire zone.  By setting the rules of 
engagement for ballot questions along the lines of suspect classification doctrine, 
the Court channeled ballot question disputes focused on discrimination questions 
toward groups with the least judicial protection—virtually inviting disputes over 
issues such as LGBT rights and immigration.  From a social movement perspec-
tive, this allowed for social hostility to be mobilized against unpopular minorities 
during the early stages of the civil rights lifecycle before the accretion of more 
political power or the recognition that a classification merited heightened scrutiny, 
which itself produced more solicitous judicial review.  This provided conserva-
tives the opportunity to use preemptive action to block the development of an 
understanding that certain issues come within the scope of civil rights claims.  
Lastly, it opened up nonlegal, openly animus-based arguments as fair game for 
lawmaking in the election context, where assessment of motivation would be 
  
44. ANDERSEN,  supra note 8, at 144–45 tbl. 11, 146.  This data does not include “measures designed 
to prevent same-sex couples from legally marrying each other.”  Id. at 143 n.2. 
45. See Gamble, supra note 21, at 258. 
46. See Michèle Finck, The Role of Localism in Constitutional Change: A Case Study, 30 J.L. & POL. 53, 
69–71 (2014); Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1905, 1907–08 (1993).  By 1993, there were 126 cities and counties, in which approximately a 
quarter of the U.S. population resided, with antidiscrimination law that included protection for 
sexual orientation.  Kenneth D. Wald et al., The Politics of Gay Rights in American Communities: 
Explaining Antidiscrimination Ordinances and Policies, 40 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 1152, 1153, 1170 app. 
(1996). 
47. See TINA FETNER, HOW THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT SHAPED LESBIAN AND GAY ACTIVISM 34–
38 (2008). 
48. Note, supra note 46, at 1908–09. 
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most difficult.  After 1970, the number of ballot questions increased dramati-
cally.49 
As LGBT-related ballot questions proliferated, electoral politics melded 
with the particular dynamics of popular constitutionalism.  Unlike the interest-
group model focused on the bargaining and compromise intrinsic to legislative 
processes, anti-gay arguments based on immorality dominated early initiative and 
referenda campaigns.50  The immorality arguments had two parts: that homosexu-
ality and elite control of decisionmaking on moral questions were both wrong.51 
Yet describing the ballot question campaigns as solely morality debates 
misses a critically important dimension.  They were also saturated with questions 
of constitutional meaning.  Despite variations in the language of each proposition, 
voters “were likely to see the issue simply as gay civil rights.”52  Often the elections 
originated in an effort to repeal an antidiscrimination provision, thus generating 
debate over whether lesbian and gay rights were a legitimate example of civil 
rights.53  Similarly, once the focal point for conservative campaigns became mar-
riage, “[c]onstitutional equality served as a master frame for the movement.”54 
The ballot question context produced one of the most enduring and effective 
tropes for conservatives opposing legal protection for LGBT persons: that lesbian 
and gay rights constituted not equal rights but special rights.  The term “special 
rights” effectively condensed the twin tropes of immorality and elitism.  At the 
same time, it also implicitly mobilized the politics of resentment against gains by 
racial minorities and women to incorporate a group that assertedly was already 
privileged to the list of those who wanted benefits without earning them.55  As 
described more fully below in Part II.B, the special rights formulation proved to 
be of lasting importance. 
  
49. STONE, supra note 23, at 3 fig.1. 
50. Donald P. Haider-Markel & Kenneth J. Meier, The Politics of Gay and Lesbian Rights: Expanding 
the Scope of the Conflict, 58 J. POL. 332, 346 (1996). 
51. See Shauna Fisher, It Takes (at Least) Two to Tango: Fighting With Words in the Conflict Over Same-
Sex Marriage, in QUEER MOBILIZATIONS: LGBT ACTIVISTS CONFRONT THE LAW 207, 224–
25, 230 (Scott Barclay et al. eds., 2009). 
52. Haider-Markel & Meier, supra note 26, at 677. 
53. See, e.g., Daniel Levin, The Constitution as Rhetorical Symbol in Western Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives: 
The Case of Idaho, in ANTI-GAY RIGHTS: ASSESSING VOTER INITIATIVES 33 (Stephanie L. 
Witt & Suzanne McCorkle eds., 1997). 
54. Jeffrey Kosbie, Beyond Queer vs. LGBT: Discursive Community and Marriage Mobilization in 
Massachusetts, in THE MARRYING KIND?: DEBATING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE WITHIN THE 
LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENT 103, 115 (Mary Bernstein & Verta Taylor eds., 2013). 
55. See Barry D. Adam, The Defense of Marriage Act and American Exceptionalism: The “Gay Marriage” 
Panic in the United States, 12 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 259, 269–72 (2003) (linking “special rights” 
argument to discourses of race and class). 
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Pro-LGBT equality groups responded to the flurry of ballot questions with 
attempts to sharpen their game in electoral politics.56  An important success came 
in 1992 with the defeat of Proposition 9 in Oregon, which sought to bar coverage 
of sexual orientation discrimination from civil rights laws and to command edu-
cation officials to recognize homosexuality as “abnormal, wrong, unnatural and 
perverse.”57  Aided by increased fundraising, the No on 9 campaign embraced 
standard techniques such as polling, canvassing, data-tested advertising, and get-
out-the-vote efforts, guided by professional political consultants.58  The result 
was repeated in 1994 when Oregon conservatives fielded another differently-
worded ballot question using the same idea.59  The No on 9 campaign’s success 
made the Oregon approach a national model,60 and later LGBT rights election 
campaigns were built on the lessons learned about use of the technologies of 
conventional electoral politics.61 
At the same time that anti-equality forces in Oregon were framing a question 
for the 1992 ballot, social conservatives in Colorado sought to head off the 
addition of sexual-orientation protections to a state civil rights statute.  They 
secured a place on the ballot for Amendment 2, a proposal to amend the state 
constitution that deployed both aspects of the strategy developed in the earlier 
campaigns against racial equality: Amendment 2 not only repealed local ordi-
nances providing civil rights protections for lesbians and gay men, but also forbade 
adoption of any state or local law according rights to homosexuals except by further 
amending the state constitution, a far more burdensome process than legis-
lative enactment.62  The conservative success in Colorado, together with a 
municipal-level victory in Tampa, Florida, prompted eighteen more ballot 
  
56. In their early responses to anti-gay ballot questions, “inexperienced social movement organizations 
led disorganized campaigns to maintain lesbian and gay rights on shoestring budgets.”  FETNER, 
supra note 47, at 85. 
57. VOTERS’ PAMPHLET: STATE OF OREGON GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 3, 1992, at 93 
(1992), reprinted in Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: 
The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 36 n.71 (1993). 
58. See STONE, supra note 23, at 68–73. 
59. Haider-Markel & Meier, supra note 26, at 684. 
60. STONE, supra note 23, at 65–73, 78–79. 
61. Id. at 78–79, 68–70, 96–101; see also Bob Meadow et al., Using Conservative Values to Support Gay 
Rights: How Opponents Defeated Oregon’s Anti-Gay Rights Referendum in 1994, in CAMPAIGNS 
AND ELECTIONS: CONTEMPORARY CASE STUDIES 196, 197–200 (Michael A. Bailey et al. 
eds., 2000); Harvey Pitman, In Their Own Words: Conversations With Campaign Leaders, in ANTI-
GAY RIGHTS, supra note 53, at 87–93. 
62. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31b, invalidated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also Romer, 
517 U.S. at 623–25. 
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questions in the 1993–94 election cycle, evenly divided between state and local 
contests.63 
Challenges to Amendment 2 brought significant judicial involvement into 
the constitutional arena regarding LGBT ballot questions for the first time.  The 
Colorado Supreme Court invalidated Amendment 2 on the ground that, 
although it did not discriminate against a suspect class, it violated the fundamental 
right to participate equally in the political process.64  When Romer v. Evans65 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court, that Court also struck down Amendment 2, 
but decided neither to adopt the Colorado Supreme Court’s reasoning about 
political participation, which would have opened possibilities for more expansive 
intrusion into the practices of direct democracy, nor to declare sexual orientation 
a suspect classification, which would have extended strict scrutiny to a new and 
still politically weak group.  Instead, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court 
invoked a per se equal protection analysis with few clear precedents, apparently 
grounded in rational basis review but in a more rights-protective form than the 
Court was willing to acknowledge.66 
However inscrutable its doctrinal moorings and despite its absence of a 
finding of suspect classification, the Court’s decision in Romer had a powerful, 
albeit limited, political effect on the ground.  It effectively stopped conservatives’ 
efforts to adopt clones of Amendment 2 designed to cut off future state and local 
antidiscrimination provisions.  Petitioning for such ballot questions was aban-
doned in Oregon and Idaho,67 and traditional values groups eventually dropped 
the push for preclusive state constitutional amendments regarding antidiscrimi-
nation laws.68  But in the same way that proponents of race-driven ballot questions 
moved from anti-integration efforts to using affirmative action as a lightning rod, 
anti-LGBT organizations turned to a new issue: marriage. 
B. Direct Democracy and Marriage 
Within a few months of Romer v. Evans, and ostensibly because of a state 
trial court decision in Hawaii, which found that the state had failed to satisfy a 
  
63. KIMBERLY B. DUGAN, THE STRUGGLE OVER GAY, LESBIAN, AND BISEXUAL RIGHTS: 
FACING OFF IN CINCINNATI 8 (2005). 
64. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284–86 (Colo. 1993). 
65. 517 U.S. 620. 
66. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632–33. 
67. STONE, supra note 23, at 72–73, 74. 
68. See FETNER, supra note 47, at 98–99; STONE, supra note 23, at 33–34. 
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compelling interest standard to justify its marriage exclusion,69 Congress enacted 
the Defense of Marriage Act (DoMA),70 signaling that LGBT rights debates 
had moved to a new level.  On the issue of same-sex marriage, politics quickly 
swallowed law in at least three dimensions: partisan mobilization, advocacy tech-
nologies, and strategic prioritization. 
1. Partisan Mobilization 
The partisanship was not subtle.  DoMA emerged from a Republican-
controlled Congress just prior to the 1996 election, thereby forcing President 
Clinton and every Democratic member of Congress either to anger the pro-
LGBT segment of the party’s base by supporting it, or to alienate the middle-of-
the-road voters who objected to same-sex marriage by opposing it.71  Within the 
Republican Party, conservatives organized to prioritize the marriage issue, and 
pressured each candidate in that year’s Iowa primary to “sign a pledge opposing 
same-sex marriage.”72  Conservatives seized the opportunity to reinvigorate their 
use of LGBT issues to “mobilize the[ir] base,” and resuscitated the device of a 
preclusive state constitutional amendment.73 
From 1990 until 2014, propositions centered on marriage dominated the 
arena of statewide votes on civil rights issues.  During that period, there were fifty-
three statewide votes on LGBT-related issues, of which forty-three involved 
same-sex marriage.  These votes occurred in thirty-five states.  By comparison, 
during the same period, there were twenty-one statewide ballot questions in 
fourteen states involving race, gender or both; and twenty-six votes in fifteen 
states on proposals related to immigration.74 
  
69. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), aff’d, 950 P.2d 
1234 (Haw. 1997), remanded from Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
70. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 
(2012)). 
71. Craig A. Rimmerman, The Presidency, Congress, and Same-Sex Marriage, in THE POLITICS OF 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 273, 276–78 (Craig A. Rimmerman & Clyde Wilcox eds. 2007); Richard 
Socarides, Why Bill Clinton Signed the Defense of Marriage Act, NEW YORKER (Mar. 8, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-bill-clinton-signed-the-defense-of-marriage-
act [https://perma.cc/8NVX-Q7MC]. 
72. SARA DIAMOND, NOT BY POLITICS ALONE: THE ENDURING INFLUENCE OF THE 
CHRISTIAN RIGHT 169 (1998). 
73. Bayliss J. Camp, Mobilizing the Base and Embarrassing the Opposition: Defense of Marriage Referenda 
and Cross-Cutting Electoral Cleavages, 51 SOC. PERSP. 713, 715–187 (2008). 
74. The data in this paragraph comes from my own compilation based on multiple sources.  The 
number of marriage-related votes includes one that addressed domestic partnership laws (Colorado 
2006) and two that featured questions on both marriage and antidiscrimination laws (Idaho 1994 
and Washington 2009). The remainder of the LGBT-related issues addressed solely 
antidiscrimination coverage. 
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Only a semantic distinction separates state constitutional amendments to 
bar same-sex marriage from the design of Colorado’s Amendment 2 to prevent 
expansion of civil rights protections.  But in a world in which popular votes 
against affirmative action were legitimate because they did not directly and 
explicitly burden a suspect class in the way that the first anti-civil rights voter initia-
tives did, popular votes to restrict same-sex marriage did not trigger the narrowly-
defined circle of civil rights protection. 
Whether constitutional or statutory in its aim, each campaign about 
marriage generated an episode of popular constitutional contestation and inter-
pretation.  Populist mobilization against marriage equality, and the extent to 
which it dovetailed with Republican efforts to appeal to socially conservative voters, 
peaked in the November 2004 election.75  Same-sex marriage questions were on 
the November ballot in eleven states, and conservative leaders claimed credit for 
President Bush’s re-election.76  With each state that adopted or more deeply 
inscribed its ban on same-sex marriage, the sense deepened that Americans 
intended marriage to exist as a naturalized institution, grounded in religion, and 
functioning as a natural right a priori to the state. 
2. Technologies of Advocacy 
During the same period, pro-equality groups led the increasing use of 
election-campaign-oriented tools of advocacy in litigation, the second bleed from 
politics into law.  Even the possibility of a ballot question shaped litigation strategy.  
Attorneys at Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) selected 
Vermont as the jurisdiction for the first lawsuit brought by a national organization 
to overturn a state ban on same-sex marriage in part because amending the 
Vermont Constitution required multiple legislative votes before a question could 
go before voters.77  After Vermont, GLAD lawyers saw the prospect of litigating 
marriage in Massachusetts as a partly defensive move, necessitated by plans of an 
anti-gay group to put the issue before voters.  GLAD believed that acting affirm-
atively through litigation would offer the best chance to control framing of the 
issue and to stop momentum for a popular vote.78  A few years later, in analyzing 
whether a Midwestern state would be ripe for a marriage challenge, “the most 
  
75. See FRANCES FITZGERALD, THE EVANGELICALS: THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE AMERICA 
491–94, 497–500 (2017). 
76. Id. at 505–06. 
77. Mary L. Bonauto, The Litigation: First Judicial Victories in Vermont, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, 
in LOVE UNITES US: WINNING THE FREEDOM TO MARRY IN AMERICA 71, 73–74 (Kevin M. 
Cathcart & Leslie J. Gabel-Brett eds., 2016). 
78. Id. at 79. 
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important factor” behind the decision by Lambda Legal attorneys to file suit in 
Iowa was that its process for amending the state constitution by ballot question 
was the most cumbersome of any state in the region.79 
GLAD’s challenges to marriage exclusions in Vermont80 and Massachusetts81 
pioneered the use of the technologies of electoral politics, especially polling and 
voter canvassing, as central components of marriage-equality litigation.  GLAD 
worked in tandem with the Vermont Freedom to Marry Task Force, and began 
laying the groundwork in 1995 for the lawsuit filed in 1997.  In both states, 
activities included training volunteers for public speaking in favor of marriage 
equality, designation of a media team, and town halls and open meetings to test 
the level of support for litigation and to build infrastructure for broader public 
education efforts once it was filed.82 
After Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,83 in which the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court invalidated the state policy of denying marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples on state constitutional grounds, GLAD’s chief concern 
became blocking the effort by opponents to put a state constitutional amendment 
on the ballot that would effectively erase the decision.  Although advocates 
engaged with legislators and others in multiple ways, polling and field operations 
were central.  Bonauto and others involved in the Goodridge litigation had not 
stopped polling or sending canvassers door to door when the case had been filed, 
nor did they stop when the decision was issued.84  The possibility of a voter 
referendum to reverse Goodridge did not finally die until 2007.85 
GLAD’s emphasis on non-litigation activities in the early marriage cases 
largely flew under the radar, although it is unlikely that publicizing them would 
  
79. Camilla Taylor, “Our Liberties We Prize”: Winning Marriage in Iowa, in LOVE UNITES US, supra 
note 77, at 131, 132–33; see also STONE, supra note 23, at 131. 
80. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
81. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
82. ANDERSEN, supra note 8, at 197; Scott Barclay & Anna-Maria Marshall, Supporting a Cause, 
Developing a Movement, and Consolidating a Practice: Cause Lawyers and Sexual Orientation 
Litigation in Vermont, in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY 
IN LEGAL PRACTICE 171, 187–89 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2005); Greg 
Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15, 28–30 (2000); 
cf. MARC SOLOMON, WINNING MARRIAGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW SAME-SEX 
COUPLES TOOK ON THE POLITICIANS AND PUNDITS—AND WON 84–86, 107, 129 (2014) 
(discussing town meetings and canvassing experiences in Massachusetts); VT. FREEDOM TO 
MARRY TASK FORCE, MARRIAGE SPEAKING POINTS (1996) (on file with the author). 
83. 798 N.E.2d 941. 
84. NATHANIEL FRANK, AWAKENING: HOW GAYS AND LESBIANS BROUGHT MARRIAGE 
EQUALITY TO AMERICA 142–43 (2017). 
85. See Pam Belluck, Bid to Ban Gay Marriage Fails in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/us/154cnd-gay.html. 
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have rebutted the opposition’s contention that gay marriage was sought by a 
privileged few in the refined chambers of elite judges.  Each victory in court legit-
imized the arguments for equality that advocates made outside of court, but also 
reinforced the trope that this was a battle between an already advantaged minority 
on one side and ordinary, that is, heterosexual, people on the other. 
3. Strategic Prioritization 
The importance of ballot questions in antidiscrimination and marriage 
equality efforts shaped the internal dynamics of the movement as well as the 
broader legal and political landscape.  The dominance of electoral politics effec-
tively resolved internal disputes over movement directions and tactics.  Some 
fissures were particular to marriage; others were continuations of tensions that 
had surfaced in earlier rounds of ballot question campaigns.  All occurred in 
multiple jurisdictions to a greater or lesser extent.  In each instance, the resolution 
of the movement’s internal tensions in electoral politics carried over into litiga-
tion, and eventually into substantive law. 
The first tension grew out of the ideological paradox of same-sex marriage: It 
simultaneously embodies conservative norms and radical change.  To tradition-
alists, especially those with a strong affiliation to a conservative religious faith, the 
idea of two men or two women marrying seemed an extremist, liberal, secular 
travesty, a violation of natural law.86  To some progressives, especially feminists 
and sex-radical gay men, the idea of expanding the scope of an institution steeped 
in gendered practices and linked to the legitimation of some forms of consensual 
sex but not others seemed misguided at best and retrogressive at worst.87  
Arguing for a right to marry triggered attacks from equality supporters88 as 
well as traditionalist opponents.89  The need to persuade voters who skewed 
  
86. See Mark Strasser, Natural Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 54–56 (1998). 
87. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF 
QUEER LIFE 87–92 (First Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed. 2000) (1999); Michael Boucai, 
Glorious Precedents: When Gay Marriage Was Radical, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 12–17 (2015); see 
NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES 
UNDER THE LAW 107–09 (2008); see, e.g., Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to 
Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 9, 14. 
88. Mary Bernstein & Verta Taylor, Introduction: Marital Discord: Understanding the Contested Place of 
Marriage in the Lesbian and Gay Movement, in THE MARRYING KIND?, supra note 54, at 1, 8–22 
(outlining the arguments against marriage within the LGBT movement); Douglas NeJaime, Before 
Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 
CALIF. L. REV. 87, 90–91, 104–12 (2014) (providing historical context to the different marriage 
arguments by the LGBT community). 
89. There is a voluminous literature opposing marriage equality from outside the LGBT community.  
See, e.g., Sherif Girgis et al., What Is Marriage?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 245 (2011). 
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conservative channeled advocates into addressing the former concern and 
managing the latter. 
Defensive instincts in the face of hostility also played a part.  Debates in 
popular media over same-sex marriage morphed into arguments about the 
morality of homosexuality.  This slippage mobilized LGBT rights supporters, 
who would have preferred a different battle, to support the marriage-equality 
campaign.  Queer family politics, which had emphasized legal protection for a 
variety of relationship forms and were central to earlier stages of the LGBT 
movement, were gradually overshadowed by the politics of marriage. 
The correlative strategic and tactical tension concerned questions of which 
methods of voter persuasion should be emphasized.90  LGBT-rights advocates 
had argued among themselves since the 1970s and 1980s about whether the 
primary goal in ballot question contests should be winning the specific election 
or—especially if victory at the polls seemed unlikely—creating or strengthening a 
movement infrastructure that would outlast the campaign and could be in place 
for future projects.  The first approach suggested more emphasis on strategies 
derived from elections, including voter canvassing, polling, hiring professional 
campaign staff, and building a get-out-the-vote machine for the one-time mobi-
lization characteristic of elections.91  The other longer-term strategy sought to 
foster ongoing coalitions and use communications resources, such as advertising, 
to feature same-sex couples and their children as part of a project to make hesitant 
voters more comfortable with LGBT people.92 
This strategic dispute was indirectly a manifestation of ideological splits 
between more mainstream and more radical advocates.93  Increased professional-
ization of campaign methods made success in elections more likely, but its 
assimilationist message contributed to the impression that gay translated into 
white and middle-class.94  Internal debates proliferated over “evasive messaging,” 
especially with regard to arguments related to children95 and the hesitancy to 
feature openly lesbian and gay persons in advertisements.96  These internal 
  
90. FETNER, supra note 47, at 96–97. 
91. STONE, supra note 23, at 51–54. 
92. Id. at 77, 82–83. 
93. Leachman, supra note 14, at 1680–83. 
94. See STONE, supra note 23, at 51–55, 158–61; see, e.g., DUGAN, supra note 63, at 56–64 (2005) 
(discussing the identity tensions in the LGBT movement in Cincinnati). 
95. STONE, supra note 23, at 146–47. 
96. Cf. DUGAN, supra note 63, at 103.  This remained a sore point.  Historian Michael Klarman noted: 
“Images of same-sex couples [marrying in San Francisco] were quickly broadcast . . . across the 
country and enabled conservatives to mobilize grassroots campaigns for state constitutional 
amendments to bar gay marriage.”  KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 191.  He argues: “The West 
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conflicts persisted, but were increasingly sidelined as the stakes in the marriage 
debate heightened. 
In retrospect, one can see that 2003 marked the beginning of extraordinary 
acceleration and sophistication in marriage equality politics.  In June of that year, 
the Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas,97 ruling that states could not 
prohibit same-sex sodomy.98  Justice Scalia signaled in his dissent that the greatest 
danger for conservatives lay in the conceptual path to same-sex marriage that had 
been adopted by the majority.99  The Goodridge opinion issued in November 
appeared to validate his warning.  President George W. Bush issued a statement 
condemning Goodridge, and vowing “to do what is legally necessary to defend the 
sanctity of marriage.”100  He followed up a few months later in his 2004 State of 
the Union address with a call to enact a federal constitutional amendment to limit 
the definition of marriage.101  The New York Times reported that 55 percent of 
Americans supported an amendment to the U.S. Constitution to “allow marriage 
only between a man and a woman.”102 
Facing a rapidly escalating debate, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) commissioned opinion research to inform both long-term and short-
term strategy on marriage, then convened GLAD and other legal groups to 
  
Coast marriages [of early 2004], more than the Goodridge decision that inspired them, ignited the 
powerful backlash of [November] 2004.”  Id. at 192. 
97. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 604–05 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“This case ‘does not involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage 
only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this 
Court.”). 
100. Pam Belluck, Same-Sex Marriage: The Overview; Marriage by Gays Gains Big Victory in 
Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/19/us/same-sex-
marriage-overview-marriage-gays-gains-big-victory-massachusetts.html; President Defends Sanctity 
of Marriage, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH (Nov. 18, 2003), https:// 
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031118-4.html [https://perma. 
cc/E5CE-JBHD]. 
101. President George W. Bush: Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, AM. 
PRESIDENCY PRO., http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29646 [https://perma.cc/ 
L54H-X64W] (presenting a transcript of President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint 
Session of the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 20, 2004)) (“If judges insist on forcing their 
arbitrary will upon the people, the only alternative left to the people would be the consitutional 
process.  Our Nation must defend the sanctity of marriage.”).  President Bush continued to express 
his support for a federal constitutional amendment throughout 2004 and into 2006.  William C. 
Duncan, Speaking Up for Marriage, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 915, 925–29 (2009). 
102. Katharine Q. Seelye & Janet Elder, Strong Support Is Found for Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 21, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/21/us/strong-support-is-found-for-ban-on-
gay-marriage.html. 
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discuss the results and how best to move forward.103  The report from the Belden 
Russonello media relations firm advised advocates to focus on the one-third of 
voters “neither consistently supportive nor consistently opposed to gay mar-
riage.”104  It also provided the first indication that advocates needed to “chang[e] 
the frame from gays to marriage.”105  Its top recommendation for a “message 
concept” stressed emotive associations focused on themes of commitment,106 a 
major shift from the emphasis placed on the rights arguments that had been used 
until that point.107 
Conservatives responded to the 2003 victories in Lawrence and Goodridge 
with a renewed emphasis on ballot questions, coordinated with President Bush’s 
campaign for re-election.108  On election day 2004, voters in eleven states amended 
their constitutions to bar same-sex couples from marriage after voters in two 
additional states had similarly prohibited same-sex marriage earlier in the year.109  
Even in Oregon, where movement leaders believed they had their only plausible 
chance of success based on the sophistication of local advocates, voters amended 
the state constitution.110 
C. Polycentric Constitutionalism 
Ballot questions and other mechanisms of direct democracy111 constitute 
only one arena for the evolution of constitutional meaning, but they were a highly 
salient force for LGBT-related issues.  They also illustrate the fundamental 
  
103. See BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, LIVE AND LET MARRY: COMMUNICATING TO 
PERSUADABLE VOTERS ABOUT MARRIAGE RIGHTS FOR GAY COUPLES, FINDINGS FROM 
TEN FOCUS GROUPS (2003) (on file with author). 
104. Id. at 3. 
105. Id. at 5. 
106. Id. at 11. 
107. For example, in the 1996 Vermont Freedom to Marry talking points, which contain suggestions 
for arguments that volunteers should emphasize in speaking to voters, the first two “basic themes” 
stressed the large number of legal benefits and protections that flow from marriage, and the 
discriminatory nature of “government interference with a couple’s choice to marry.”  VT. 
FREEDOM TO MARRY TASK FORCE, supra note 82, at 6–9. 
108. Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 467–70 
(2005). 
109. See ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1; GA. CONST. art. I, § 4 ¶I; KY. CONST. § 233A; LA. CONST. 
art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263A); MO. CONST. art. I, § 
33; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; 
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29.  All were on 
the November 2004 ballot, except for Louisiana and Missouri, where the votes occurred earlier in 
2004.  Same-Sex Marriage Bans Winning on State Ballots, CNN (Nov. 3, 2004), http://www.cnn. 
com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/11/02/ballot.samesex.marriage [https://perma.cc/9555-H7SV]. 
110. STONE, supra note 23, at 134–36. 
111. Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1096, 1097–98 (2005). 
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polycentrism of American constitutionalism along two axes.  Political power and 
state authority are not concentrated in one or even a small number of government 
institutions, but are widely dispersed both vertically through federalism and hori-
zontally through separation of powers.  Second, although formal mechanisms of 
subsidiarity exist, the reality of legal change is often more a function of network-
style iterations than of top-to-bottom mandate, involving non-state as well as 
state actors. 
The multiple power centers of American governance create a plethora of 
intervention points where lawyers can apply pressure, as well as an interactive 
process for constitutional change.  The Supreme Court stands alone in its authority 
to interpret the Constitution, but it also a widely accepted political reality that the 
Court does so in tandem with signals from a variety of sources, what Justice 
Ginsburg called “a dialogue with other organs of government, and with the people 
as well.”112 
The fullness of constitutional meaning cannot be understood through only 
case law or important statutes.  It is not the product of only one or two sets of 
processes, nor the creation only of the judiciary.  This complexity and openness of 
U.S. constitutional discourse created the pockets of contestation where Americans 
debate the equality of LGBT persons as citizens with respect to a universe that 
may have been constituted by the formal apparatus of law or not (such as the 
policies adopted by private workplaces and faith groups).  Ballot question elections 
were the most significant of these pockets. 
The drive to enact antidiscrimination laws covering sexual orientation both 
thrived and foundered in this polycentric universe, and polycentricity was the 
curse that later became the savior of the marriage equality movement.  Operating 
in this dense legal and cultural ecosystem, social movements contribute directly to 
the construction of constitutional meaning.  But the influence does not all flow in 
one direction from movement action to the various venues for lawmaking.  As the 
ballot question focus shifted from antidiscrimination law to marriage, something 
new happened.  A particular form of lawmaking—direct democracy—drove the 
creation of a new model of social movement. 
II. STRUCTURE: A NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT MODEL 
During 2004, a quarter of the states banned same-sex marriage.  In response, 
ten leaders of LGBT rights organizations gathered for a two-day strategy summit 
  
112. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198 (1992). 
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in a Jersey City airport hotel in May 2005.113  Almost all were lawyers, most from 
litigation organizations; participation was by invitation only.  The meeting arose 
from a decision by LGBT rights advocates and the leading funders for the 
movement to rethink the marriage strategy, with the understanding that a number 
of funders would work collaboratively to support an effort that was more coopera-
tive among the advocacy groups.114  By the time the meeting ended, the partici-
pants had adopted a new strategy to achieve same-sex marriage.  The agreement 
was embodied in Winning Marriage: What We Need to Do115 (hereafter Winning 
Marriage I), which was modified at a meeting five years later by a slightly larger 
set of organizational representatives in Winning Marriage: The Path Forward116 
(hereafter, Winning Marriage II). 
The goal of the new phase of the marriage equality movement that Winning 
Marriage I called for was to create the social conditions under which institutions 
with Supremacy Clause power could be persuaded to act.  The strategy of 
both Winning Marriage documents was derived from a particular historical 
understanding of why certain civil rights movements had succeeded: that the 
Supreme Court and Congress function as consolidators, rather than creators, of 
new social norms, “[d]espite widespread beliefs to the contrary.”117  Based on that 
understanding, Matt Coles of the ACLU and the other authors118 expected federal 
law to “foster[] the eventual national resolution” to allow same-sex marriage, but 
only after it became socially acceptable and legally valid in many states.119 
  
113. Interview with Matthew Coles, Former Deputy Legal Dir. & Dir. of Ctr. for Equal., ACLU (July 
10, 2015); see also FRANK, supra note 84, at 208–09; SOLOMON, supra note 82 at 95–96; cf. DAVID 
LEWIS, PROTEUS FUND, HEARTS & MINDS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HOW 
PHILANTHROPY AND THE CIVIL MARRIAGE COLLABORATIVE HELPED AMERICA 
EMBRACE MARRIAGE EQUALITY 4–5 (2015) (discussing a summit of 26 national LGBT leaders 
in Denver in 2005).  
114. Interview with Matt Coles, supra note 113; FRANK, supra note 84, at 207–08; cf. LEWIS, supra note 
113, at 5 (discussing the strategy at the 2005 Denver summit).   
115. MICHAEL ADAMS ET AL., WINNING MARRIAGE: WHAT WE NEED TO DO (2005), https:// 
s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2108219/final-marriage-concept-paper. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/GRF8-L98L]. 
116. MATT COLES ET AL., WINNING MARRIAGE: THE PATH FORWARD (2010) (on file with 
author). 
117. ADAMS ET AL., supra note 115, at 14. 
118. Coles was asked to lead the project and serve as primary drafter.  The content of Winning Marriage 
I and Winning Marriage II also reflected the views of Evan Wolfson, head of Freedom to Marry.  
Interview with Matt Coles, supra note 113; SOLOMON, supra note 113, at 95.  See generally LEWIS 
supra note 113, at 2 (noting Wolfson founded Freedom to Marry). 
119. ADAMS ET AL., supra note 115, at 14. 
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A. Winning Marriage I: A Movement/Campaign Hybrid 
Winning Marriage I called for a coordinating organization, separate from 
all existing groups, to execute state-specific plans and strategies, “[m]uch like a 
national candidate campaign.”120  Although Winning Marriage I acknowledged 
important roles for legislatures and, to a lesser degree, courts, it argued that the 
essential goal was “winning the public.”121  “[S]uccess will depend on our ability 
to mount sweeping public education, field and political efforts . . . .”122  Strikingly, 
litigation was de-emphasized, contradicting the conventional wisdom of much 
law and society scholarship that litigation will play a central role in any social 
movement.123  Also striking was the group adoption of an election campaign as its 
core, primary strategy. 
Winning Marriage I sought to create a tipping point specifically for the 
Supreme Court, where final and complete success would be achieved.  The 
authors proposed a state-by-state approach in which advocates would seek to 
shift states into greater levels of legal recognition for same-sex couples.  They 
sought to achieve full equality in the most hospitable states and, in other states, 
provision of all of the rights and duties under state law (a status usually called civil 
union), allowance of a lesser number of rights and duties (usually called domestic 
partnership) or more narrowly focused improvements in legal protections for 
same-sex couples.124 
Winning Marriage I also identified an intermediate goal: ten states with 
marriage, ten states with a civil union type status of full recognition, ten states 
with other relationship or civil rights, and twenty states for which the goal was 
“climate change.”125  The group believed that this target could be met in fifteen to 
twenty years, that is, by 2020 or 2025.126  The 10/10/10/20 goal was flexible—the 
specific dates and which states would go into which buckets were approximate—
but clear enough to allow for measurement.  And, if it could be achieved, it might 
indicate that it was safe to bring a full-on challenge to the Supreme Court. 
  
120. Id. at 9. 
121. Id. at 2–3.  Coles has noted: “For change in a republic to be real and to endure, the people have to 
accept it.  That insight, not universally shared at the time, was central to the ultimate winning 
strategy.”  Matt Coles, The Plan to Win Marriage, in LOVE UNITES US, supra note 77, at 100, 106. 
122. ADAMS ET AL., supra note 115, at 2. 
123. See Leachman, supra note 14, at 1687, 1693–95. 
124. For a description of the various statuses other than marriage, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & 
NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 719–21 (3d ed. 2011). 
125. ADAMS ET AL., supra note 115, at 3. 
126. Id. at 6. 
1690 64 UCLA L. REV. 1662 (2017) 
 
 
The Winning Marriage project created a new model for cause lawyering 
and marked a turning point in the sophistication of advocacy.  It built on two earlier 
versions of an incrementalist concept for law reform.  The NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund achieved fame for the systematic march-to-Georgia-style 
approach to test litigation in its desegregation campaign, winning a series of 
Supreme Court decisions that culminated in Brown v. Board of Education.127  
More recently, it has become commonplace for public interest organizations to 
eschew litigation-only strategies and instead deploy multiple modes of advocacy 
that integrate lobbying and public education.128  With this newer approach, 
different zones of law can form the cutting edge at different times and in different 
jurisdictions, allowing for versatility in identifying the most receptive institutions 
for new interpretations of law. 
Winning Marriage I took the multi-modal strategy for legal change to a 
third stage.  Although the ultimate goal was highly specific and quite narrow—to 
end an exclusion through identified specific intermediate legal achievements, the 
method behind the strategy was to give muscle and meaning to clichés about the 
power of “the court of public opinion” in ways that could be elaborated both 
discursively and organizationally.  Winning Marriage I incorporated election 
campaigns focused on issues rather than candidates into the menu of venues that 
the movement would prioritize, and it baked election victories into its core metric 
of success.  This step had cascading effects.  Central to the Winning Marriage 
effort was using multiple substantive and emotional messages (not just legal or 
quasi-legal arguments), which could be micro-targeted to specific audiences, and 
using metrics of success—such as opinion poll numbers, interactions with voters, 
and get-out-the-vote results—that were drawn from the operations of a political 
campaign. 
The Winning Marriage strategy was not new in fostering work in multiple 
venues and at both federal and state levels.  By this point, LGBT rights advocates 
had been engaged in a broad range of efforts, with multiple forms of advocacy, 
covering many issues, and meeting semi-annually to plan broad strategies and 
  
127. JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS 
FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 85–87, 112–15 (1994); MARK V. TUSHNET, 
MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–
1961 (1994).  See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
128. ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 515–20 (2013); Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The 
Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2046–48 (2008). 
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major litigation.129  What was different in Winning Marriage I was the combina-
tion of placing “the primary goal of changing the way people think . . . at the 
forefront” of a “national campaign to win marriage”130 with elections as the central 
barometer of success. 
The participants in the Jersey City meeting realized that this approach 
would not be easy, inexpensive, or familiar.  Communications expertise would be 
at the core.  To secure and manage the necessary finances and other resources, 
Winning Marriage I called for creation of a central organization with no focus 
other than legalizing same-sex marriage.  The groups represented at the meeting 
agreed to cooperate in its creation and governance.  The result would be a new 
entity capable of “launch[ing] significant new efforts in field, public education, 
electoral and other political work, and fundraising.”131 
Drawing on what the advocates had learned from opinion research, 
Winning Marriage I identified the public education goal as securing support of 
the “movable middle” of the population often prioritized by candidates for office.  
“First and foremost, we need to learn how to create conventional wisdom on 
marriage both by crafting the content of that wisdom and engineering the 
structures that effectively disseminate it across our target audiences (i.e. the 
‘movable middle’).”132  Most of the marriage-related opinion research that had 
been done had been geared to defeating particular ballot measures in particular 
locations.  Winning Marriage I called for major additional investments to research 
how to move public opinion more broadly on the underlying issue of same-sex 
marriage.133  “Continuous measurements of the efficacy of our public education 
efforts is resource intensive but critical.”134 
The marriage equality campaign became the first to meld social marketing 
with an election-style nationwide political campaign.  Opinion research, especially, 
became increasingly sophisticated, as consultants moved beyond polling and 
focused on expanding their understanding of the emotional motivators that 
inhibited moveable middle voters from supporting same-sex marriage.135  Patterns 
  
129. Kevin M. Cathcart, The Sodomy Roundtable, in LOVE UNITES US supra note 77, at 51, 53–54; 
Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 
1235, 1312–18 (2010). 
130. ADAMS ET AL., supra note 115, at 5, 8. 
131. Id. at 6. 
132. Id. at 7. 
133. “The trouble was, research of this scope and quality was expensive—an initial investment was 10 
times the cost of a typical statewide poll.”  LEWIS, supra note 113, at 8. 
134. ADAMS ET AL., supra note 115, at 7. 
135. See, e.g., Molly Ball, The Marriage Plot: Inside This Year’s Epic Campaign for Gay Equality, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 11, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/12/the-marriage-
plot-inside-this-years-epic-campaign-for-gay-equality/265865 [https://perma.cc/3BK8-2TYX] 
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began to emerge.  Rights talk appealed to liberals who were the core supporters of 
equal marriage rights.  More feedback came in to support the decision to use 
themes based on “love, commitment, fairness, and freedom” for the not-yet-
persuaded.136  The legal arguments that had initially dominated public outreach 
by LGBT rights groups began to give way.  Litigators began talking about using 
“fairness” rather than “equality” and focusing on “the moral values of commit-
ment, love, family, children, community, dignity, and respect.”137  The changes in 
legal discourse outside the courts eventually migrated from press conferences, 
speeches and media projects into litigation documents and judicial text.138 
Using lessons learned from increased opinion research and message testing, 
GLAAD and the Movement Advancement Project published a forty-page guide 
for advocates titled Talking to the Moveable Middle About Marriage (hereafter 
Talking to the Middle) in January 2008.139  Talking to the Middle reaffirmed the 
need to substitute emotionally textured arguments for rights claims, but it also 
deeply analyzed voter psychology.  Consistent with a survey that drew widespread 
attention within the advocacy community, in which 57 percent of respondents 
believed that gay people “did not share their basic values,”140  Talking to the Middle 
described an overarching belief among moderate voters that “gay people aren’t 
like me.”141  Describing these voters as more fearful of change than biased against 
LGBT people, Talking to the Middle advised: 
If gay people weren’t seen as outsiders, including gay people in marriage 
would be less problematic.  To address this outsider status, we need to 
help Americans think about gay people as part of the community.  
Communications [should] emphasize common ground . . . In terms of 
marriage, this means talking about marriage in a way that echoes how 
straight Americans talk—and think—about marriage.142 
  
(discussing the work of Amy Simon, a California-based pollster who conducted a statewide survey 
on “the underlying emotional dynamics that were driving the voters who were ‘in the middle’ on 
gay marriage”). 
136. Messaging, Messengers and Public Support, FREEDOM MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/ 
pages/Messaging-Messengers-and-Public-Support [https://perma.cc/AS5E-V7AD]. 
137. Jon W. Davidson, Keynote Address: Winning Marriage Equality: Lessons From Court, 17 YALE J.L. 
& FEMINISM 297, 299, 307 (2005). 
138. See infra Part V. 
139. GAY & LESBIAN ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION & MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT 
PROJECT, TALKING TO THE MOVABLE MIDDLE ABOUT MARRIAGE (2008) [hereinafter 
TALKING TO THE MIDDLE] (on file with the author). 
140. LEWIS, supra note 113, at 8. 
141. TALKING TO THE MIDDLE, supra note 139, at 3. 
142. Id. at 4. 
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The document described another overarching belief among moderate 
voters: that “gay people don’t need more rights.”143  Same-sex couples could live 
together and execute wills and other documents to address property questions 
regardless of whether they were married.  Talking to the Middle argued that debates 
about rights, benefits, and legal protections missed the point: People in the 
middle “don’t think of marriage as a legal institution . . . [It] is more about rela-
tionship validation than legal protections.”144  Voters heard arguments about 
unequal benefits as a Trojan Horse for securing social validation that gay rela-
tionships were on equal moral footing with heterosexual ones. 
Equality advocates seemed to face a paradox. Arguments about rights made 
them appear to be selfish: “[I]f we only talk about rights and protections, we risk 
reinforcing the misperception that gay people don’t enter marriage in the same 
spirit as straight people.”145  On the other hand, too much talk about social legit-
imacy and validation of their relationships threatened voters who feared that 
marriage as an institution was already on the decline and resisted what they saw as 
the further devaluation that would be caused by ending the exclusion.  Talking to 
the Middle recommended careful selection of which concrete harms to em-
phasize: the right to visit a partner who is in the hospital or to take leave from 
work to care for a sick partner.146  Infringement of these rights hampers “the ability 
of committed couples . . . to take care of and be responsible for each other.”147 
Talking to the Middle also incorporated a fundamentally new understanding 
about ambivalent voters drawn from research.  It explained that many were not 
hostile or unfamiliar with LGBT people; they wanted to do the right thing, but 
were deeply conflicted over what that was.148  Helping voters resolve this conflict 
by reassurance and emphasis on shared experiences and values, rather than by trying 
to persuade them to change their minds based on logic or rationality, became one 
of the most important strategies in the same-sex marriage movement. 
In seeking to operationalize the Winning Marriage I game plan, advocates 
traveled a Byzantine path from election day 2004 to election day 2008.  Con-
servatives continued their rejuvenated ballot question onslaught, and by 2008, 
voters in eleven additional states had amended their state constitutions to ban 
same-sex marriage.149  For equality advocates, following Goodridge v. Department 
  
143. Id. at 3, 7. 
144. Id. at 7. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 8. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 3. 
149. See generally ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03; ARIZ. CONST. art. 30, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; 
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of Public Health,150 there were only litigation losses151 until the months immedi-
ately prior to the 2008 election, when the highest courts of California152 and 
Connecticut153 ruled that exclusionary laws were unconstitutional on state law 
grounds.  The biggest legislative successes were to come in 2009 when Vermont 
stepped up from civil union recognition to full marriage recognition and in winning 
full marriage legislation in New Hampshire.154  Overall, the most successful legis-
lative strategy during this period produced laws that created new non-marriage 
relationship categories, such as civil unions, in ten states and the District of 
Columbia.155  Public opinion polls continued to register modest increases in sup-
port for marriage or for other legal recognition of same-sex couple relationships.156 
These ups and downs paled, however, by comparison to the attention given 
to California’s Proposition 8, which sought to amend the state constitution to 
specify that marriage could exist only between a man and a woman, effectively 
overturning the litigation victory that year.157  Given the ease of ballot access in 
California, both sides had expected that a referendum on marriage equality would 
be forthcoming after the court’s ruling.  Preparation for the ballot question began 
before the court ruled, and massive resources fueled the contest.  Few understood 
that Proposition 8 also provided an acid test of the electoral politics model that 
had been adopted by the Winning Marriage I summit in 2005.  When voters 
adopted Proposition 8 with a 52 to 48 percent margin,158 the loss of marriage 
equality in California stunned the movement. 
  
CONST. art. XXI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; VA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 15-A; WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13. 
150. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
151. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); 
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005) (en banc); 
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (en banc). 
152. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
153. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). 
154. See generally N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (Supp. 2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §8 (2010). 
155. Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 151, 169 (2009).  This is not to say that adoption of domestic partnership or 
other alternative status laws, usually at the municipal level, were easy or uncontested.  Like marriage 
equality proposals, these laws were the target of numerous ballot question initiatives.  Id. at 180–81. 
156. Id. at 165–67, 165 tbl.2, 166 tbl.3. 
157. DEBRA BOWEN, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY, 
NOVEMBER 4, 2008: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 128 (2008) (providing the 
language of Proposition 8: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California”).  Proposition 8 was adopted and added to the Calfornia Constitution at CAL. CONST. 
art. I § 7.5. 
158. Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 5, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/06marriage.html. 
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B. Winning Marriage II: Regrouping After Armageddon 
Advocates responded to Proposition 8 by doubling down on their efforts to 
develop a strategy that would succeed in electoral arenas.  The same group of 
strategists as in 2005 was joined by representatives of four foundations and con-
vened again in late March 2010 to revise their strategy.159  Again, while the new 
strategy agreement, Winning Marriage II, addressed multiple venues for advocacy, 
elections loomed largest.  “As long as marriage has lost every popular vote, it 
w[ould] be almost impossible to build a sense that the nation is ready for it.”160  
Participants recommitted to prioritizing the arenas where “we have made the 
least progress”: public persuasion and national field capacity.161  “Any idea that 
the 2005 paper gave too much emphasis to public persuasion ought to have been 
dispelled by the 2008 election for good.”162 
The advocates gathered for the Winning Marriage II summit revisited the 
tipping point metaphor from Winning Marriage I, understood as the key to 
“get[ting] the Court ready for marriage.”163  In Winning Marriage II, they faced 
three variables that had not been factors in 2005.  First, by 2010, the number of 
states where there was no state constitutional amendment that blocked same-sex 
marriage and often a marriage-equivalent status as well had diminished, which 
narrowed the number of states that could be put into play for step-ups in the 
10/10/10/20 model.  Second, the authors feared that the federal constitutional 
challenge to Proposition 8, which they had failed to prevent,164 could reach the 
Supreme Court before the justices were ready to strike down exclusions as uncon-
stitutional, thus setting back the entire effort.165  The third new factor was as 
positive as the first two were negative.  The hostile executive branch of 2005 had 
been replaced by an administration supportive of LGBT rights, creating 
unforeseen possibilities for progress at the federal level. 
With this new mix of danger and opportunity, the authors of Winning 
Marriage II paid even greater attention than they had in Winning Marriage I to 
finding the tipping point, the moment when they could present the ultimate 
question to the Court with the greatest likelihood of success.  By 2010, the 
  
159. See MATT COLES ET AL., supra note 116; see also FRANK, supra note 84, at 277. 
160. MATT COLES ET AL., supra note 116, at 15. 
161. Id. at 4. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 17. 
164. CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 128, at 1311. 
165. MATT COLES ET AL., supra note 116, at 10. 
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authors realized that the “legal profession and judges in particular may be ahead 
of America on civil rights and sexual orientation.”166  But specificity proved elusive: 
If the Supreme Court believes that despite the somewhat slow pace of 
political change, the country as a whole is ready for marriage, we may 
be able to persuade it to act when half the states or a little more still 
don’t allow either marriage or full partnership . . . [But] the Court 
would have to believe that a strong majority of Americans not only 
supported marriage, but believed that denying it is deeply wrong.167 
The most obvious marker for a tipping point would be when a majority 
of states recognized same-sex marriage (and perhaps other fully equivalent 
statuses).168  But the existence of state constitutional amendments barring same-
sex marriage in more than half the states put this point far into the future without 
the federal courts stepping in, and the Winning Marriage group believed that the 
courts were not yet ready to rule in their favor.  Advocates began framing the 
tipping point to be when major opinion polls repeatedly found that a majority of 
the population agreed with marriage equality for same-sex couples. 
The group entered what turned out to be the final phase of the Winning 
Marriage campaign with a recommitment to developing “deeper strategies aimed 
at ultimate persuasion”169 and to working even more collaboratively.170  “The 
research and experience we have from ballot campaigns, legislative efforts, and 
past public education campaigns needs to be collected and actively shared.”171  
The plan was to use the pooled information to generate “template messages, talking 
points, and approaches for local, state and national organizations.”172 
The investment in elevating the sophistication of communications research 
had begun soon after Proposition 8,173 but an even more massive ramping up of 
resources and work followed the 2010 summit.  Freedom to Marry, the non-
litigation advocacy group founded by Evan Wolfson, expanded its role as the 
  
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Loosely grounded in constitutional history, this definition of a tipping point alludes to cases like 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), or Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), when the Court 
invalidated a practice that most states had already abandoned. 
169. MATT COLES ET AL., supra note 116, at 12. 
170. See Thalia Zepatos, The Marriage Movement’s Secret Weapon: Radical Cooperation, HUFFPOST 
(June 26, 2015, 2:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thalia-zepatos/the-marriage-move 
ments-se_b_7665696.html [https://perma.cc/T392-W263]. 
171. MATT COLES ET AL., supra note 116, at 13. 
172. Id. 
173. FRANK, supra note 84, at 276–77. 
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central campaign organization called for in Winning Marriage I.174  Funders 
increased their support.175 
What emerged was a network architecture that linked research, testing, 
state affiliates, litigators, lobbyists, and media, with Freedom to Marry at the hub.  
The different organizations involved in the effort, although often rivals, agreed to 
share the results of opinion polls and surveys.176  Consultants tested and analyzed 
ideas for messages that emerged from the opinion surveys, measuring their im-
pact both as to content and as to the effects of different speakers.177  Advertising 
was created to target not only the movable middle as a whole, but also specific 
segments of the middle.178  Approaches that seemed promising were deployed 
across many types of communications from television ads to talking points for 
lobbyists to canvassers in multiple states or at the federal level.  To expand its on-
the-ground presence and assist in coordination and building coalitions, Freedom 
to Marry added state-level affiliates.179 
The long-sought breakthrough in an electoral arena came in the fall 2012 
election, when marriage equality advocates surprised even themselves by winning 
all four marriage questions on the November ballot in Maine, Maryland, 
Minnesota, and Washington.180  Expertise, technology, and resources gelled to 
create sophisticated campaigns in each state.  Knowing that movable middle voters 
were conflicted, strategists switched from using canvassers primarily to identify 
supporters for later get-out-vote-efforts to a model of “conversation canvassing” 
in which hundreds of paid and volunteer staff members went door-to-door seeking 
to explain to voters why same-sex couples wanted and needed marriage.181  
Pro-equality groups were able to respond to opponents’ advertising with precision 
and speed.  Within a day after the ad that had been crucial to persuading 
Californians to vote for Proposition 8 had been broadcast in Minnesota, the 
  
174. Id. at 277–78. 
175. Id. 
176. Messaging, Messengers and Public Support, supra note 136. 
177. Ball, supra note 135. 
178. Id.; SOLOMON, supra note 82, at 234 (describing the filming of speakers from diverse backgrounds 
endorsing same-sex marriage). 
179. See Josh Zeitz, The Making of the Marriage Equality Revolution, POLITICO MAG. (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/gay-marriage-revolution-evan-wolfson-
117412 [https://perma.cc/QRV3-9ZM6]. 
180. See SOLOMON, supra note 82, at 263–64; Adam Liptak, States’ Votes for Gay Marriage Are Timely, 
With Justices Ready to Weigh Cases, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
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181. See SOLOMON, supra note 82, at 235–36, 241–45; see also LEWIS, supra note 113, at 12; Ball, supra 
note 135. 
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marriage equality response was on the air.182  Equality supporters spent an esti-
mated $42 million on the campaigns in the four jurisdictions.183 
Seven months after the 2012 election, the judicial breakthrough came.  In 
United States v. Windsor,184 the Supreme Court ruled that DoMA was unconsti-
tutional. After Windsor, the movement changed its focus from winning elections 
to litigation.  Lawsuits were filed in every state that barred same-sex marriage.185 
The Civil Marriage Collaborative directed a greater portion of financial support 
to financing the litigation.186  Nonetheless, the public education campaign did 
not cease.  Ballot-question-style advertising was mounted in some locations 
where the state law was being litigated, even when there was no election pending.187 
In many ways, Windsor itself was the tipping point, at least for lower court 
judges who read the opinion as a clear signal that marriage equality was rapidly 
approaching.188  Judge Richard Posner’s change of heart illustrates the dramatic 
pre- and post-Windsor difference.  In 1997, Judge Posner had written that 
“[p]ublic opinion may change . . . but at present it is too firmly against same-sex 
marriage for the courts to act.”189  In a decision invalidating state exclusionary 
laws in 2014, he wrote that the state’s only rationale for the exclusion “is so full of 
holes that it cannot be taken seriously.”190 
When the same-sex marriage debate returned to the Supreme Court in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, the question of whether a tipping point had occurred was a 
central issue, although not framed in those terms.  Section IV of Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion for the Court rebutted the argument in Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent 
that the Court should allow more time for consideration of the constitutional 
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validity of exclusions of same-sex couples to percolate in the political branches.191  
In justifying judicial intervention based on the degree of democratic deliberation 
that had already occurred, Justice Kennedy pointed to “referenda, legislative 
debates, and grassroots campaigns.”192  The Court also cited the “enhanced 
understanding of the issue” reflected in the “arguments now presented . . . as a 
matter of constitutional law.”193  The Court was ready to decide. 
C. Movements, Campaigns, and Metrics 
The lawyers who adopted the Winning Marriage strategy statements saw 
marriage equality as a project within the bigger movement and utilized an election 
campaign model to create and guide their work.  The result was a highly sophis-
ticated mobilization toward the goal of winning marriage equality at the ballot 
box in order to create a strong enough tipping point to bring about a victory in the 
Supreme Court.  To my knowledge, there has been no other example of the self-
conscious construction of this hybrid: an election-style campaign designed for 
issue-based advocacy. 
There is no magic definition for the distinction between a social movement 
and a campaign.  A reasonable distillation of several versions in the sociological 
literature would define a social movement as a broad, long-range effort to change 
fundamental aspects of social relations, whereas a campaign generally targets a 
more specific goal to be achieved in a shorter time of intense activity.194 Con-
sistent with that definition, I use “movement” in reference to the effort to win legal 
and social equality for LGBT Americans. 
  
191. Compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (“There have been referenda, legislative debates, and 
grassroots campaigns, as well as countless studies, papers, books, and other popular and scholarly 
writings.  There has been extensive litigation in state and federal courts.  [M]any of the central 
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labor unions, religious organizations, law enforcement, civic groups, professional organizations, and 
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C.J., dissenting) (“[P]eople are in the midst of a serious and thoughtful public debate . . . . [It] must 
be allowed to continue.”). 
192. Id. at 2605 (majority opinion). 
193. Id. 
194. See Suzanne Staggenborg & Josée Lecomte, Social Movement Campaigns: Mobilization and 
Outcomes in the Montreal Women’s Movement Community, 14 MOBILIZATION 163, 164 (2009).  
Evan Wolfson describes marriage equality as a campaign within the LGBT rights movement.  See 
Transcript of April 26, 2013 Symposium Keynote Discussion Between Evan Wolfson and Olatunde 
Johnson, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. REV. 846, 851 (2014) [hereinafter Keynote Discussion] 
(“[D]riving that movement, guiding that movement, generating that movement is . . . a central 
campaign that is going out of business when this is done.”).  On this understanding, a campaign 
could be one component of a broader movement or be a stand alone mobilization, such an election 
campaign. 
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In this Part, I analyze how the marriage equality campaign’s organizational 
model shaped its role as an actor in the arena of popular constitutionalism.  I 
examine how its internal processes and its relationship to the broader LGBT 
constituency and movement raise questions of accountability, an especially acute 
question in the context of mass organizing.  In much of the literature, the 
normative and instrumental components of accountability blur together.  To 
consolidate these perspectives, I posit a holistic metric that is designed specifically 
for law-oriented cause efforts.  Finally, I suggest that the political marketing 
model of the marriage equality campaign will become more common in future 
social movements. 
1. Lawyers as Leaders 
In the literature about accountability in social movements, social scientists 
have argued that efforts aimed primarily at changes in law, led by lawyers, suffer 
from a kind of gravitational pull that produces agendas that favor the concerns of 
elites, strategies constrained by legal doctrines, and outcomes that bear little 
resemblance to the ambitious visions of those in the movement whose involve-
ment tends toward protest and direct action.195  To the same effect, because the 
methods associated with electoral politics have developed in the far more 
common context of individual candidates running for office than of ballot ques-
tions, elections are regarded as inadequate mechanisms for creating meaningful or 
structural change, and are associated with episodic projects lacking a larger 
perspective than the stakes posed by each separate contest.196  For both law reform 
efforts and election campaigns, the demands of appealing to somewhat 
conservative segments of the public—like judges, legislators, or the movable 
middle—often undercut efforts to prioritize inclusivity across race and class 
lines.197 It is not difficult, nor would it be entirely wrong, to critique the marriage 
equality campaign as merely an example that illustrates the harshest of these ob-
servations.  A small group, mostly lawyers, determined that marriage would 
become the priority issue of the LGBT rights movement.  The lawyers who led 
the Winning Marriage group brought with them a familiarity with fundraising 
and strategic thinking that are often found in litigation groups.198  These skills 
  
195. Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social Movement Strategy, 96 IOWA L. REV. 
BULL. 61, 74–76 (2011); see, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1472–73, 1480–82, 1512–15 (2005). 
196. COLIN CROUCH, POST DEMOCRACY 15–19 (2004). 
197. STONE, supra note 23, at 156–61. 
198. See Leachman, supra note 14, at 1705–27. 
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supported and strengthened the focus on marriage as the primary movement pri-
ority.  And questions about the perceived whiteness of the effort and the reasons 
for it persisted.199  All of these actions related to accountability (or its lack) in 
some aspect of goal definition: in selecting which issues to focus on, in defining 
the scope and depth of what would constitute success, and in portraying the 
movement’s constituency through the prism of particular goals. 
Some scholars believe that efforts such as the marriage equality campaign or 
even the broader goal of securing equal rights for LGBT persons should not be 
categorized as social movements at all.  The more traditional approach to defining 
social movement is functional, stressing mobilization to achieve goals by targeting 
some aspect of a political system.200  More recently, Tomiko Brown-Nagin has 
argued that politicized legal campaigns and social movements comprise different 
categories of collective effort.  Genuine social movements are unique in that they 
are grounded in participatory, rather than indirect or representative democracy.201  
They seek change through activism that occurs outside formal structures, using 
tactics that are “protest-oriented and disruptive of the normal course of politics.”202 
Brown-Nagin’s perspective reflects not only the understanding that move-
ments oriented primarily toward legal change exhibit recurring shortcomings, but 
also that de-marginalization should start at home insofar as social movements are 
concerned.  In other words, the strong likelihood that a lawyer-led or law-focused 
movement will either increase, or at best not decrease, the internal stratification 
within a constituency amounts to more than a flaw.  Instead, this particular shortfall 
signals a missing definitional element to the components of a broad movement to 
change what matters most.  Unless a movement is oriented to enhancing the 
participation and power of the most disadvantaged within a community, it simply 
lacks the potential to bring about significant change in social relations. 
This more demanding view of social movements strikes me as normatively 
important as a guideline for lawyers and non-lawyers alike.  I agree that lawyers 
  
199. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” for “Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity and 
Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1370–71 (2000); R. A. Lenhardt, 
Integrating Equal Marriage, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 766–68 (2012). 
200. See, e.g., Michael W. McCann, How Does Law Matter for Social Movements?, in HOW DOES LAW 
MATTER? (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998) 76, 77–78 (agreeing with Sidney Tarrow’s 
definition of a social movement as mostly involving an “attempt to mobilize [a constituency] in 
direct action in relation to a target of influence in the political system” (quoting SIDNEY TARROW, 
STRUGGLING TO REFORM: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLICY CHANGE DURING CYCLES 
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may fail to realize “the impact of their expertise on their imagination.”203  But it is 
surely true that non-lawyer leadership is no guarantee of either enhanced 
accountability or more ambitious reach in goal-setting.  The much more problem-
atic barrier is the tension between this approach and the kind of highly profes-
sionalized and expensive techniques that were evident in the same-sex marriage 
campaign and that other movements may seek to replicate. 
2. Assessing Law-Oriented Cause Efforts 
Regardless of category or nomenclature, I offer the following set of queries 
as a metric for assessing strengths and weaknesses in outcomes for a law-oriented 
cause effort: 
1. Did the movement or campaign achieve the material or tangible 
changes in law that were its primary goal and then follow up with 
steps to implement and embed those changes to protect them 
from countermovement responses? 
2. In the internal dynamics of the movement or campaign, were 
there mechanisms for accountability and deliberation to create 
broad and diverse support within the relevant constituency or po-
litical group for its goals and strategies? 
3. Did the work of the movement or campaign enhance the power 
and voice of those within its constituency? 
4. Did the strategies of the movement or campaign include mecha-
nisms to maintain mobilization and momentum for future efforts, 
including responses to possible backlash? 
5. Did the overall effect of the work of the movement or campaign 
change the surrounding social culture as well as the law?204 
Of these five metrics, all except the third point would be consistent with efforts 
on both the political left and right. 
For several of these queries, it is too soon to fully evaluate the marriage 
equality campaign.  In the immediate aftermath of Obergefell, resistance to same-
sex marriage has been limited to individual service providers or government 
officials who object to same-sex marriage and proposals from conservative 
advocacy groups for religious exemptions that would permit them to refuse to 
  
203. Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and 
Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2801 (2014). 
204. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, 72 
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provide such services.205  The question of whether Obergefell survives in robust or 
only formalistic terms will probably turn on whether conservative religious groups 
can successfully draw on a sufficient institutional base for resistance, in a way 
comparable to how the public school administrative structure created the in-
frastructure that supported the efforts of Southern school officials to undercut 
desegregation plans.  Similarly, it is too early to assess the maintenance of 
momentum at this time.  The next two Parts of this Article address the dynamics 
and impact of the discursive strategies that grew out of the marriage equality 
campaign, which relate to the third issue of internal movement stratification and 
the fifth culture-shifting question.  I return to address those dimensions of 
movement advocacy in Part V. 
It is not too soon, however, to consider the standard criticism of litigation-
oriented groups and strategies: They crowd out other approaches, thereby weak-
ening the more radical potentials of those movements and strengthening a 
juricentric concept of rights.  The analysis of the marriage equality campaign 
strategy in this Article both validates and contradicts this conclusion.  The mar-
riage equality effort was led by lawyers, heavily advised by experts in different 
fields, with results that were both predictable (de-radicalizing the politics of family 
and cementing the leadership role of lawyers) and surprising (de-centering of liti-
gation in movement strategy and relying on a non-law frame for public argument).  
Advocacy went forward in multiple arenas, but the model used by marriage 
equality advocates to reconfigure the effort was a national political campaign with 
a litigation arm.  Litigation over federal constitutional claims—the old test case 
model from the 1960s and 1970s—took center stage only as an end-game strategy. 
3. Looking to the Future 
What the future holds for the structure of legal and political initiatives is 
unclear.  The most difficult challenges for a social movement involve policy 
changes that would benefit persons perceived as most different from the white 
middle-class norm and that would entail redistribution of resources from those 
with more to those with less.  The marriage equality campaign succeeded in 
surmounting the first of these barriers by renorming the LGB206 constituency to 
  
205. See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert granted sub. 
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fit a conventional model of couples, and it did not confront redistribution 
questions. 
In its structure, the marriage equality campaign may come to be seen as an 
early example of a particular type of social change effort: a methodologically 
versatile, professionally managed, expertise-rich, and well-funded public policy 
campaign with limited, measureable goals for change.  One can imagine such 
efforts growing out of civil rights/equality movements on behalf of other constit-
uencies, from web-based efforts built around virtual as well as in-person protests; 
from candidate campaigns driven more by a shared agenda organized around a 
particular cluster of issues than the identity of the candidate; or from coordinated 
efforts to enact, repeal or amend major legislation.  The success of the marriage 
equality campaign has already drawn considerable interest from other move-
ments.207 
As with the marriage campaign, the structures to which such efforts will be 
held accountable likely will not take the form of mass organizations with active 
memberships, but instead will consist of those with the resources to invest in the 
particular project.  This continues a trend in which civil society organizations 
increasingly depend on professional staff with the diminishment of meaningful 
member involvement.208  Resource providers will include individual donors, char-
itable foundations, and other political actors of all ideological stripes—a sector of 
the public interest law world that likely will continue to accrue greater power and 
influence.209  Management of donors may become a standard part of a cause 
lawyer’s job description.  Perhaps the most consequential question is whether 
aggregated funding decisions can be marshaled to support significantly redis-
tributive policy changes. 
Public interest lawyering has long required a mix of organizing, resources, 
constituency mobilization, and public education, as well as litigation and lobbying 
strategies.  The marriage equality example demonstrates that the level of sophisti-
cation in all these realms has increased exponentially.  Election campaigns now 
live or die by their expertise in microtargeting messages and audiences.210  Large-
scale litigation efforts are beginning to face the challenge of having to do the same. 
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III. SOCIAL MEANINGS: THE BATTLE FOR DISCURSIVE SPACE 
Constitutional meaning is conventionally thought to be created through a 
melding of its doctrinal foundations, continuous interpretation, popular un-
derstandings, and judicial enforcement.  Most scholarly literature remains vague 
on how exactly new constitutional meanings are constructed.  Opinion polls may 
show a shift from position A to position B on a given issue, and social movements 
can generate new understandings of empirical facts as attitudes change about a 
constituency.211  But what is essential to juridical interpretation is change in the 
elements of a constitutional compound—elements such as the components of a 
definition of equality and liberty, the kinds of harm that are cognizable, and 
which public concerns constitute a legitimate goal in regulating a particular 
institution. 
There has been relatively little work identifying how bottom-up processes 
have constructed constitutional meaning.212  For popular constitutionalists, key 
questions remain unanswered: “What will the people themselves talk about, and 
how will they talk about it, when they serve as the ultimate interpreters of the 
Constitution?”213  Other questions persist as well, questions about the quality of 
decisionmaking, the influence of social movements and the role of constitutional 
discourse in debates outside formal judical arenas. 
The process that emerged from ballot question elections related to LGBT 
rights provides a granular account of meaning construction.  Elections became a 
laboratory for testing legal arguments, and, to a limited but noticeable extent, liti-
gation strategy took on attributes of a political campaign. 
A. Cultures of Institutional Discourse 
Institutions of governance provide venues for the deliberation and resolution 
of conflicting norms and policies and the emergence of new constitutional 
meanings.  This Article primarily concerns two such institutions: decisions by 
voters and decisions by courts.  These provide a stark contrast to each other in 
  
211. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based 
Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1988–94 (2006); id. at 1992 (“A recent report . . . which 
concluded that marriage by same-sex couples serves . . . children’s best interests would not likely 
have been produced absent societal changes sparked by the social movement for marriage equality.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
212. An exception is Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). 
213. James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution Seriously 
Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1377, 1398 (2005). 
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how rules, norms, and social meanings are constructed.214  In the context of same-
sex marriage, the dynamic and ultimately congruent process by which these two 
sharply different contexts produced new meanings was unique. 
Voters and judges speak in distinctly different voices.  Voters take no oath to 
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, nor can they be expected to.  In 
elections, politics and perceptions of self-interest legitimately take precedence 
over constitutional principle.  Factual assertions are largely unpoliced and no 
formal process exists for deliberation.  Each side seeks to mobilize its base and 
persuade the undecided, using increasingly sophisticated market-tested methods.  
The arguments used by each side are widely broadcast, but the decisions by indi-
vidual voters are guaranteed the anonymity of the voting booth.  Outcomes are all 
or nothing.  Opinion surveys, deduction, and statistical analysis are the methods 
used for understanding the results, to the extent that explanations can be dis-
cerned.  Voting based on bias and misinformation is frequent.  It is, to paraphrase 
Churchill, the worst process for governance except for all the others.215 
Judges, on the other hand, are not only accorded the freedom to reach 
counter-majoritarian results, but are charged with doing so when necessary to 
correct for distortions of the democratic process, including those that render 
minorities unable to participate effectively, or in the face of blatantly arbitrary 
action.  Judges must provide reasoned and public explanations for their actions.  
They operate within professional constraints of precedent and analogy, and employ 
a highly structured process for the determination of facts.  Argumentation occurs 
in public, but often is not widely disseminated.  Judges may, and frequently do, 
press the parties for compromise and settlement. 
The marriage equality campaign—with its iterative and continuous interac-
tions between politics and law, the electoral and judicial venues—illustrates 
points of convergence and difference between the two realms.  In both locations, 
adversaries sought to meld and change the competing social and constitutional 
meanings of marriage and equality.  This effort engaged both pro-equality and 
anti-gay advocates in the process of synthesizing master frames related to those 
two concepts with a variety of localized epistemological systems specific to other 
realms, such as religion, race, and ethnicity. 
  
214. The legislative process falls somewhere between the two: more mediated than direct democracy, 
but less mediated than judicial decisionmaking.  See generally, Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of 
Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1555–58 (1990); Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New 
Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1494–1508 (2000). 
215. Winston Churchill, Speech before the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), in 7 WINSTON S. 
CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897–1963, at 7566 (Robert Rhodes James ed., 1974) 
(“[D]emocracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried 
from time to time.”). 
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The most powerful component that election campaigns and judicial texts 
share (and what legislative processes usually lack) is narrative.  In the marriage 
equality campaign, advocates reached voters in the movable middle by using 
elements of narrative, embodying issues in characters, constructing a story arc, 
and depicting the resolution of the conflict.  By its own description, “Freedom to 
Marry became a story-telling machine.”216  Later, working within the constraints 
of legal argumentation and doctrine, advocates brought a number of the lessons 
learned from election campaigns into their litigation strategy.  The frames con-
structed for elections became the frames that dominated the theater of litigation. 
B. Evolution on the Right 
Both LGBT rights advocacy groups and anti-gay conservative organizations 
have shifted their rhetorical strategies in response to changes by their adver-
saries,217 in law, in electoral efficacy, and in the interaction of the legal and political 
arenas. 
In the electoral arena, early anti-gay arguments emphasized moral deviance.  
Anti-equality groups, relying on what Murray Edelman called “condensation 
symbols,”218 used messages designed to evoke disorder, decay, disease, and moral 
chaos, and, specifically with regard to children, recruitment and corruption.219  
Conservatives relied on “regimes of clarity” in which certain text would trigger 
reactive emotions that could drive voter decisions.220 
Two ballot question campaigns in 1992 produced the first major division 
among conservatives in their framing strategies.  In Oregon, they emphasized the 
traditional morality and disgust arguments.  In Colorado, advocates of 
Amendment 2 developed an argument based on rights in order to appeal to more 
moderate voters.  This decision led to the first articulation of the “equal rights,” 
“no special rights” theme.221  The conservatives’ failure in Oregon and success in 
Colorado strengthened the nationwide appeal of the latter strategy.222 
  
216. Messaging, Messengers and Public Support, supra note 136. 
217. See FETNER, supra note 47, at 34–35. 
218. MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USE OF POLITICS 6, 8 (1964) (“Condensation symbols 
evoke the emotions associated with the situation. . . . [They are] emotion in impact, calling for 
conformity to promote social harmony, serving as the focus of psychological tensions.”). 
219. See Ralph R. Smith, Secular Anti-Gay Advocacy in the Springfield, Missouri, Bias Crime Ordinance 
Debate, in ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 53, at 95, 99–102. 
220. Katie Oliviero, Yes on Proposition 8: The Conservative Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage, in THE 
MARRYING KIND?, supra note 54, at 167, 180–83. 
221. See FETNER, supra note 47, at 84; DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTI-GAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX 
VISION AND THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 112–14 (2007); STONE, supra note 23, at 22. 
222. HERMAN, supra at 146; STONE, supra note 23, at 24–25. 
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Campaign materials in Colorado explicitly used case law indicators for suspect 
class status to distinguish sexual orientation from other bases for classifications 
which are targeted by civil rights laws.  The main pamphlet implied that special 
rights for some communities were acceptable because of the economic conse-
quences of discrimination that they suffered and characteristics over which they 
had no control.  In addition, conservatives argued that racial status was not 
defined by conduct, and was associated with political powerlessness, all in contrast 
to homosexual orientation.223  Although equality advocates never won a popular 
ballot campaign with a rights-based argument, this version of a rights argument 
worked for conservatives.  “Equal rights—No special rights!” was credited with 
the success of an anti-gay measure in a moderate state such as Colorado,224 and it 
was successfully used again in later locations225 as recently as the debates that led 
up to a 2015 referendum.226 
For the conservatives, it was the judiciary that rejected their version of a 
rights claim.  The Supreme Court—having ducked the question of suspect 
classification for sexual orientation—nonetheless explicitly rejected the claim 
that antidiscrimination laws created preferences that benefitted the groups 
enumerated in the law for protection.227  In the universe of civil rights laws refer-
enced in Romer v. Evans,228 the listing of protected characteristics is nominalist 
rather than normative; the enumeration functions to concretize and mark bound-
aries.229  The dissenting justices, however, did adopt the special rights argu-
ment,230 treating it as a given that antidiscrimination laws constitute “special 
treatment” and “preferential treatment.”231 
Forthright reliance on morality as a legitimate basis for state prohibition of 
homosexuality as a legal argument ended with the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Lawrence v. Texas,232 holding that enforcement of a moral code could not, by itself, 
  
223. ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 124, at 108, 1098–99; EVAN GERSTMANN, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED 
EQUAL PROTECTION 93–114 (1999). 
224. See GERSTMANN, supra note 223, at 102–03; Sharon E. Debbage Alexander, Romer v. Evans and 
the Amendment 2 Controversy: The Rhetoric and Reality of Sexual Orientation Discrimination in 
America, 6 TEX. F. C.L. & C. R. 261, 277, 279 (2002). 
225. See, e.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267–68 n.4 (6th 
Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996). 
226. See Williams v. Parker, 843 F.3d 617, 619 n.3 (5th Cir. 2016). 
227. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626–27 (1996). 
228. 517 U.S. 620. 
229. Id. at 628. 
230. Id. at 637–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
231. Id. at 638. 
232. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
Varieties of Constitutional Experience 1709 
 
justify criminalization of sexual practices between two persons of the same sex.233  
Nonetheless, allusions to religious claims and mobilization of conservative 
Christian supporters have continued.234  Indeed, today’s religious liberty arguments 
for exemptions from antidiscrimination laws allow conservatives to return  to that 
original core argument and identity. 
From the anti-equality point of view, the genius of the “no special rights” 
slogan is its plasticity with regard to race politics and its usefulness in appealing to 
white backlash.  Framing LGBT antidiscrimination protections as special rights 
drew on the broader backlash against civil rights laws, especially affirmative 
action remedies.235  As Robert Chang and Jerome Culp have written: “‘Special 
rights’ is always a code word for the racialization of equal protection.”236  In both 
the sexual orientation and race contexts, specialness connotes the assertion of 
entitlement to advantageous treatment and remedies particular to the privileged 
group.  Beyond the tangible unearned benefits of special rights lies the implication 
of an exemption from the cultural and moral norms to which everyone else must 
conform.237 
A study by social scientists of the vitality of the “no special rights” trope in 
2011 illustrates its continuing power.  The survey, conducted by the University of 
Washington, polled in-state voters, using one of three prompts before querying 
whether respondents supported an antidiscrimination law that included sexual 
orientation.238  One prompt reiterated the importance of equality in U.S. history; 
the second stated that equality is already guaranteed and asserted that minority 
groups are seeking special rights; and the third asked only for agreement or 
disagreement with a statement about support for civil rights inclusion of sexual 
orientation.239  The study found that the equal rights frame failed to increase 
  
233. Id. at 571. 
234. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, The Terms of the Debate: Litigation, Argumentative Strategies, and Coalitions 
in the Same-Sex Marriage Struggle, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 467, 499–503 (2012); cf. DUGAN, supra 
note 63, at 49–56 (describing the Christian Right’s movements against LGBT civil rights in 
Cincinnati in the 1990s). 
235. ANDERSEN, supra note 8, at 158–59, 172–23; GERSTMANN, supra note 223, at 102–03; cf. Jane 
S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 303–07 (1994). 
236. Robert S. Chang & Jerome McCristal Culp Jr., Nothing and Everything: Race, Romer, and 
(Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual) Rights, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 229, 239 (1997). 
237. Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller & Neal Milner, Rights as Excess: Understanding the Politics of Special 
Rights, 28 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1075, 1077–79 (2003). 
238. See generally Erin M. Adam & Betsy L. Cooper, Equal Rights vs. Special Rights: Rights Discourses, 
Framing, and Lesbian and Gay Antidiscrimination Policy in Washington State, 42 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 830 (2017). 
239. Id. at 840. 
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support for the extension of antidiscrimination law, but that the special rights did 
decrease that support.240 
The most surprising finding was that respondents who opposed legal 
recognition for same-sex couples241 were more likely to oppose antidiscrimination 
protection after hearing an equal rights prompt than after hearing a special rights 
prompt.242  The authors suggest that the impact on conservatives of hearing an 
equal rights argument, associated with liberalism, is the opposite of persuasion; it 
is more likely to incite enhanced opposition.243 
The conservative version of a rights argument—the “equal rights” but “no 
special rights” theme—mirrored and reversed the terms of the rights claims relied 
on by LGBT equality advocates.  The “no special rights” approach that resulted 
has failed so far in court, but is still used at the level of popular discourse, as is its 
sibling concept, the unfairness of affirmative action.  Whether this concept will 
play a future role in constitutional law is also too soon to know. 
C. Reframing Same-Sex Marriage 
As we have seen, after the main focus of ballot questions turned to marriage, 
equality advocates shifted emphasis away from the rights arguments that had 
cemented support among non-gay liberals in an effort to appeal to voters generally.  
They relied on research that focused on the underlying, unspoken fears of the 
movable middle.  To combat these fears, they constructed ads using a narrative 
structure that responded to emotions as much as ideas, using elements of 
narrativity—the creation of characters, the construction of a storytelling arc and 
the depiction of conflict being resolved. 
The single most important communication change was the adoption of the 
“journey story,” which became known as “J stories.”244  J story ads featured family 
members and other non-gay messengers telling the story of how they changed 
their minds about same-sex marriage.  The focus was less on the arguments and 
more on the process of changing one’s mind.  The speakers identified themselves 
with demographic groups not usually associated with predictably liberal 
positions: clergy members, Republicans, grandparents, elder veterans.  J story ads 
became marriage equality’s not so secret weapon. 
  
240. Id. at 846. 
241. The survey included an earlier question about legal recognition of same-sex couples in order to 
establish a marker for general ambivalence about LGBT rights.  Id. at 841–42. 
242. Id. at 846. 
243. Id. at 849–50. 
244. Messaging, Messengers and Public Support, supra note 136 FREEDOM TO MARRY. 
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In addition to an alternative narrative, the J story ads provided morality tales 
that countered the other side’s prescriptive discourse.  Opponents’ morality 
arguments had been based on a simple, but traditional, and credible story: My 
religion taught me that homosexuality was wrong and that being a good person 
requires that I condemn it.245  J story ads introduced a story of epiphany, similar 
to the lyrics to “Amazing Grace”: I was taught that homosexuality was wrong, but 
now I see that my gay friends and family need and deserve the same chance at a 
happy life that I have.246 
J story ads did not engage morality debates head on.  The speaker did not 
argue that homosexuality was good, but communicated how the viewer could be 
a good person without changing her opinions completely.  J story ads were geared 
less to persuading people to endorse same-sex marriage than persuading them 
that the time had come to allow it.  The goal was to develop paths that let movable 
middle voters use their own values, whatever those were, to manage their 
conflicted feelings and reject campaigns to block marriage equality. 
In the most important J story of all, President Obama’s, the focus was on 
how his conversations with others, especially his wife and daughters, had led to 
his change of heart.  In a May 2012 interview, journalist Robin Roberts asked, 
“Mr. President, are you still opposed to same-sex marriage?” His response, 
suggested if not literally scripted by advocates,247 began: “[O]ver the course of 
several years, as I talk to friends and family and neighbors.  When I think about 
members of my own staff who are incredibly committed, in monogamous rela-
tionships, same-sex relationships, who are raising kids together.”248 
During the course of the exchange, President Obama mentioned talking 
with his wife Michelle, daughters Malia and Sasha, and friends and neighbors 
seven times; religious beliefs five times; same-sex couples “raising kids together” 
four times; and monogamous same-sex relationships and problems with hospital 
visitation rights three times each.  He did not mention access to material benefits 
such as Social Security spousal survival payments even once, nor did he use the 
language or concept of equality. 
  
245. Religion was consistently cited as the basis for opposition to same-sex marriage. See generally 
Religious Beliefs Underpin Opposition to Homosexuality, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 18, 2003), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2003/11/18/religious-beliefs-underpin-opposition-to-homosexuality 
[https://perma.cc/FBQ5-253Z]. 
246. A number of the videos archived on the Freedom to Marry web page are examples of J stories.  See 
TV Ads and Online Videos, FREEDOM MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/video [https:// 
perma.cc/PT4L-37CT]. 
247. FRANK, supra note 84, at 269–73. 
248. Transcript: Robin Roberts ABC News Interview With President Obama, ABC NEWS (May 9, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-robin-roberts-abc-news-interview-president-obama 
/story?id=16316043 [https://perma.cc/6PJ4-7PR3]. 
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The J story approach provided marriage equality advocates with their first 
credible version of a morality argument, one built (knowingly or not) on what 
Walter Fisher called the “narrative paradigm.”249  Fisher recognized that individuals 
were often more persuaded by stories than by formal logic.250  He posited two 
characteristics of narrative-based decisionmaking: narrative probability, the 
degree to which a story is internally coherent, and narrative fidelity, the degree to 
which a story fits with other stories known to the audience.251  “The operative 
principle of rationality is identification rather than deliberation.”252  Fisher’s para-
digm encompasses what today we might call the crowd sourcing of cultural cues 
and referents, a process that engages and thereby tends to lock in the audience in 
the acts of creation and interpretation of public moral arguments.253 
The J stories also provided closure, a central component of narrative: Each 
was “an account about how and why the events occurred as they did. . . . The 
demand for closure ‘is a demand for moral meaning.’”254  In these ads, the journey 
process itself constituted the moral principle or point of the story, an appropriation 
and realignment of norms that proved to be more effective than a head-on 
argument about which understanding of the substantive content of “morality” 
was superior. 
By the time the question of marriage equality reached the Supreme Court, 
both sides had developed versions of morality and rights arguments. 
IV. (SAME-SEX) MARRIAGE AND (JURISGENERATIVE) PROCREATION 
In the world of electoral politics, the choices for framing and language are 
open.  In the world of litigation, however, the discursive field is constrained by 
doctrine.  For anti-equality advocates, the need to fit their normative arguments 
into doctrine shrank their discursive options because they could not invoke 
traditional or majoritarian morality as the constitutional basis for a defense of an 
exclusion.  They were left with rights arguments that either made no sense 
(harms to heterosexual spouses) or were, at best, not ripe (fears about future 
infringements on the rights of religious conservatives).  The LGBT rights advo-
cates, on the other hand, having translated their rights arguments into emotive 
  
249. WALTER R. FISHER, HUMAN COMMUNICATION AS NARRATION: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY 
OF REASON, VALUE, AND ACTION 47, 57–59, 62–64 (1987). 
250. Cf. id. at 48. 
251. Id. at 64. 
252. Id. at 66. 
253. Id. at 68–69. 
254. Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, Narrating Social Structure: Stories of Resistance to Legal Authority, 108 
AM. J. SOC. 1328, 1341 (2003). 
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language, then translated them back into law, thus expanding their rhetorical 
repertoire.  This Part traces how arguments developed for electoral campaigns 
made their way into litigation. 
Lawyers serve as a type of translator: fitting the needs of their clients into 
legally legible concepts and advocating for changes in, or enforcement of, the law 
in ways that will benefit those clients.  When the facts indicate, an eviction can 
become a breach of contract; a lost job can become a claim of discrimination.  But 
there is a catch.  The power associated with the discourse of law (and the credibility 
that flows from the social advantages of having lawyers as spokespersons) may 
mean that what begins as a radical challenge to hierarchy—for example, tenants 
should have the right to bargain collectively with landlords over rent and 
conditions—not only becomes translated into a legal claim, but also reduced to one. 
For marriage equality, translation of popular discourse into legal discourse 
did not have a conventional reductive effect.  The greatest contribution to shaping 
a new social meaning of marriage came not from a formal framework of law, but 
from the popular version of constitutional discourse that had been extensively 
analyzed, molded and deployed as a result of the focus on elections in the 
Winning Marriage strategy.  These frames made their way into briefs255 and oral 
arguments at multiple levels, including the Supreme Court.256 
There were three critical junctures between the reframed discourse of mar-
riage as developed by the Freedom to Marry coalition and constitutional doctrine.  
At each point, the frame of arguments designed for popular elections migrated 
back into the language of judge-made law.  What may have seemed on the 
surface like a conventional, if superbly executed, litigation strategy also imported 
the products of direct democracy. 
A. Equal Protection: Treating Like Alike 
No principle is more central to equal protection law than the command that 
like must be treated alike.  If a group has traditionally been treated so adversely by 
the legal system that its functioning in normal majoritarian politics has been 
  
255. In Bourke v. Beshear, 135 S. Ct. 1729 (2015), the companion case to Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (2015), the ACLU’s brief for the parties stated in the first paragraph of its Introduction: 
“[Petitioners] come together here to make no extreme demands.  Instead, they ask merely to be 
treated like everyone else . . . .”  Brief for Petitioners at 2, Bourke, 135 S. Ct. 1729 (No. 14-574), 
2015 WL 860741, at* 2. 
256. Oral argument in Obergefell v. Hodges began as follows: “The intimate and committed relationships 
of same-sex couples, just like those of heterosexual couples, provide mutual support and are the 
foundation of family life in our society.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 1929996, at *4. 
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impaired, the Supreme Court has recognized that judicial protection is appropriate.  
Alternatively, if a group has not been pervasively disadvantaged, the Court asks 
only whether the classification in question bears a rational relationship to a 
legitimate state interest. 
Whether heightened scrutiny should be applied to classifications based on 
sexual orientation has long been a point of dispute.  In ballot-question elections, 
both sides used descriptions of the criteria for suspect class status as arguments 
that LGBT persons should or should not be included in the equality precepts of 
civil rights governance or in the structure of the institution of marriage.  The 
Supreme Court consistently, if implicitly, has declined to utilize the more protec-
tive constitutional standard to test sexual orientation classifications.257  In both 
electoral arenas and in the federal judiciary, therefore, lesbians and gay men had 
been deemed insufficiently analogous to racial and religious minorities and women 
to justify heightened scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, LGBT rights lawyers won an equal protection decision in 
Romer v. Evans258 and an equality-inflected Due Process Clause decision in Law-
rence v. Texas,259 prior to the Supreme Court decisions in the marriage cases.  
LGBT rights lawyers had become accustomed to deploying the rational basis 
argument successfully, despite its weakness, by highlighting the improper nature 
of the state’s interest.260  Lower courts were left to wonder which of the estab-
lished tests applied to sexual orientation classifications.261 
The discursive strategy of reducing otherness, which  was developed for 
elections, provided a third option, neither heightened scrutiny nor the upgraded 
rational basis test: sameness.  Advocates stressed that same-sex couples were, in 
their essence, not only like different-sex couples but were essentially the same.  
On this understanding, the same-sex couples’ entitlement to a remedy, and 
indeed their social legitimacy, derived not so much from being an historically 
downtrodden minority nor from the mean-spirited motivations behind the 
exclusionary laws, but from their sameness to the heterosexual, heteronormative 
majority. 
  
257. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603–04; United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
258. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
259. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
260. See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 889 (2012) 
(“Proving that a law is based on unconstitutional animus is virtually the only way an equal 
protection plaintiff can prevail under [the] deferential and increasingly common standard [of 
rational basis review].”). 
261. See, e.g., Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 740 F.3d 471, 480–84 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
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This is not to say that advocates for marriage equality failed to assert a con-
ventional claim for heightened scrutiny of the gay exclusion from marriage.  But 
as is evident from Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court, sameness won the 
day.  Recognition of LGBT persons as a social minority and assertions about 
malevolent state interests are absent.262  Among the discursive strands that advo-
cates put before the Court as options for grounding the opinion, Justice Kennedy 
did not use the minority analogy, and conflated commonality with sameness. 
The conflation is a matter of degree rather than kind, but it is nonetheless 
telling.  I recognize that the concepts of commonality and sameness exist on a 
continuum rather than as anchors for a dichotomy.  In analyzing other classifi-
cations under the Equal Protection Clause, courts often stress commonality: 
attributes that the majority and minority share.  At the same time, however, in 
race and sex discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has recognized differences 
at the core of its analysis, including in the criteria for suspectness.263  A mixed dis-
course of difference, commonality, and equivalence permeates equal protection 
jurisprudence.  For example, the only acceptable rationale for affirmative 
action policies is their function in sustaining diversity,264 and the Court has noted 
that some inherent differences between the sexes can be “grounds for celebra-
tion.”265  A comparable acknowledgement of difference is absent from the opinions 
in United States v. Windsor266 and Obergefell v. Hodges.267 
Whether done consciously or not, the threading of a sameness trope 
throughout the litigation allowed marriage equality advocates to escape from the 
trap of needing suspect class analysis.  In the past, advocates had stressed the 
argument that lesbians and gay men were discriminated against because of differ-
ence from the majority and similarity to other minorities, and therefore should 
  
262. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594 (“[I]t is the enduring importance of marriage that underlies 
the petitioners’ contentions.  This . . . is their whole point.”); id. at 2599 (“This is true for all 
persons, whatever their sexual orientation.”); id. at 2600 (“The right to marry thus dignifies couples 
who ‘wish to define themselves by their commitment to each other.’” (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2689)); id. at 2601 (“There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect 
to this principle . . . .”); id. at 2602 (“Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes 
of marriage . . . .”). 
263. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 667, 684 (1973) (“There can be no doubt that our 
Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.  Traditionally, such 
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, 
put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.” (footnote omitted)); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483, 489–90 (1954) (cataloguing the differences in the quality of schools that white children 
experienced compared to Black children before ultimately finding an equal protection violation). 
264. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016). 
265. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
266. 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
267. 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
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receive heightened scrutiny.  Now, in response to the success of their argument 
frames developed for elections and to the lack of precedent for heightened scrutiny, 
they argued that this group should be treated the same because they are the same.  
This approach also left their opponents in a bind.  Had the Court given more 
credence to conservatives’ arguments against sameness, equality advocates could 
have flipped the not-same arguments to become the basis for recognition as a 
minority and heightened scrutiny review, but the Court did not take that path. 
In this way, LGBT advocates successfully deployed both assimilationist and 
minoritizing discourses.  Perhaps a deeper, more authentic level of social 
acceptance—based on variation in sex and gender culture as well as sameness—
would have been gained through a minoritizing discourse, but it was lost in the 
“no difference” arguments that grew out of electoral strategies.  In opting for this 
new approach in its opinion, the Court generated a legitimacy, as well as an 
understanding of equality, heavily grounded in sameness. 
B. Commitment and Children 
What gave the treating-same-the-same approach to equal protection its 
strongest punch were two non-legal tropes derived from communications 
research that made their way into the briefs of the marriage equality advocates: 
the prioritization of love and commitment over material benefits as the reason for 
desiring to marry, and the appropriation of children’s welfare to justify the 
expansion of marriage. 
Frankly emotive language started to become more prominent in briefs after 
the initial Belden Russonello survey research findings that urged its use in ballot 
question campaigns.  In a Lambda brief filed in 2006, for example, the opening 
pages resonate with aspirational universalizing language: 
 Marriage remains a dream for many Americans, including for 
plaintiffs, a vision of what can be for two people and their family, with 
commitment, love and patience. . . Plaintiffs want to marry their 
unique partners, to have and to hold them, under the shelter of New 
Jersey’s marriage laws, until death do they part.  Everyone knows what 
that means.268 
In California a year later, the merits brief filed by the National Center for 
Lesbian Rights, joined by several other LGBT rights organizations, cited record 
  
268. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, 4–5, Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (No. 
58,389), 2006 WL 6850898, at *3, *4–5. 
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evidence, developed during earlier stages of the lawsuit, in support of the following 
facts: 
Each couple wishes to marry in order to express their profound love 
and commitment to one another.  Those who are parents also seek an 
end to the state’s harmful messages to their children that there is 
something unworthy about their parents, and something illegitimate 
about their family.  In addition, as lesbian and gay couples, they hope 
to reduce their legal and social vulnerability.269 
In its consideration of whether the California statute barring same-sex mar-
riage violated the state constitution, the state supreme court asked the parties to 
brief several supplemental questions related to whether state law was compelled 
to recognize marriage in any form.  In responding to a question about whether 
any constitutionally guaranteed substantive attributes were intrinsic to marriage, 
plaintiffs’ counsel affirmed that their clients wished to secure access to the legal 
rights and obligations of marriage: 
Much more fundamentally, however, they wish to marry for the same 
reason that most people do: because they deeply love their partners and 
wish to express their love and commitment, and to publicly join their 
lives together, in the way that marriage—and only marriage—makes 
possible.  They also wish to participate in the shared life of the 
community [in an institution that] they and others view not only as a 
fundamental human right, but as a fundamental dimension of human 
experience and belonging.270 
When the question of the constitutionality of the exclusion reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the briefs filed on behalf of same-sex couples repeatedly wove 
the lessons learned from popular constitutional discourse into more traditional 
legal arguments.  The summary of argument invoked the concerns of same-sex 
couples “who seek to make a binding commitment in the unique institution of 
marriage.”271 
  
269. Respondents’ Opening Brief on the Merits at 12, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) 
(No. S147999) (citations omitted), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/05Rymer_Opening_ 
Brief_on_the_Merits.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZQ3-WV6H]. 
270. Respondents’ Supplemental Brief at 18, Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (No. S147999), 2007 WL 
2733221, at *18.  Later in the same brief, counsel described “[t]he cases that establish a right to 
marry [as] not premised on particular tangible benefits, but upon the majestic status of the marital 
relationship itself. . . .  The command of the constitution is for the state to affirm and support the 
human capacity for love and commitment, not merely to distribute legal rights.”  Id. at 36. 
271. Brief for Petitioners at 19, DeBoer v. Snyder, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-571), 2015 WL 
860740, at *19.  
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The first two paragraphs of the argument section in this brief combined 
both commitment and children: 
 Marriage is a commitment like no other in society.  It announces to 
the world a union that society understands.  It grounds couples.  It is a 
vow, recognized by the State, to stay together when times are hard.  It 
provides a social safety net of reciprocal responsibility for the less affluent 
of two spouses—security for homemakers and stay-at-home parents—
in the event of death or divorce. 
 Marriage brings stability to families.  It tells children that they have, 
and will always have, two parents. . . . Marriage brings dignity to adults 
and children alike.272 
Although same-sex couples raising children would seem to count among 
the family formations in which two cannot be assumed to be the correct number 
of persons functioning as parents,273 marriage equality advocates successfully 
framed arguments related to children around an emphasis on sameness to the 
imagined norm rather than pluralism in childrearing structures.  Among the 
plaintiffs in the cases consolidated in Obergefell, same-sex couples raising children 
were significantly over-represented in number and more likely to be white than in 
the LGBT population at large.274  Thus the sameness was with a particular form 
of family, which was implicitly framed as a superior environment for children 
compared to unmarried or single parent households.275 
Whether the legalization of same-sex marriage will contribute to the greater 
social legitimacy of family formations other than the married biological parent 
model, despite the rhetorical construction of lesbian and gay parents in the 
litigation as mimicking predominantly white, middle-class heteronormative 
structures, is one of the many questions remaining open after Obergefell.276 
  
272. Id. at 22. 
273. Recognition of this in the legal literature dates back at least to Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does 
Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other 
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990). 
274. Nancy D. Polikoff, Concord With Which Other Families?: Marriage Equality, Family Demographics, 
and Race, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 99, 107–08 (2016) (“Although only 16–18% of same-
sex couples are raising children, about 69% of the plaintiff couples in the combined cases that made 
up Obergefell were parents. . . .  Five of the 22 individuals in the 11 plaintiff-parent couples (23%) 
were people of color, yet 34% of individuals in same-sex couples raising children are people of 
color.” (footnotes omitted)). 
275. See Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 387 (2012) (exploring “the marriage equality movement’s use of illegitimacy as a means 
of bolstering claims for same-sex marriage” and arguing that this “further marginali[zed] less 
normative forms of kinship and belonging”). 
276. Compare Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 
1207, 1256–57 (2016) (positing that by accepting the argument that having unmarried parents 
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C. A Unitary Fundamental Right: Joining, Not Changing 
When the first challenges to the marriage exclusion based on sexual orienta-
tion were brought in the 1970s, courts responded in brief opinions declaring that 
persons of the same sex who sought to marry presented a claim that was self-
evidently different from the situation of two heterosexuals wanting to marry.277  
The courts relied on a naturalized understanding of marriage as inherently con-
tingent on gender difference.  The definitional tautology that same-sex marriage 
cannot be marriage haunted equality advocates up to and through the final stages 
of Obergefell, when it formed a major basis for Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent.278 
No recommendation from the communications research was more 
important to claims made either in litigation or popular discourse than the em-
phasis on the desire of same-sex couples to “join” marriage rather than alter it.  
For example, in the challenge to Proposition 8, plaintiffs’ counsel told the 
Supreme Court that their clients agreed with opposing counsel “that marriage is 
a unique, venerable, and essential institution.  They simply want to be part of 
it.”279  The primary brief in Obergefell v. Hodges, after arguing based on the experi-
ence of Massachusetts that “same-sex couples are strengthening marriage, not 
harming it,”280 concludes with these words: 
[E]nding the exclusion of same-sex couples from the freedom to marry 
no more changes the nature of marriage than Loving did, and it no 
more changes the nature of marriage than women’s suffrage changed 
  
harms children, the Court has made it more difficult for all nonmarital families to secure 
recognition and rights), with Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 
HARV. L REV. 1185, 1237 (2016) (arguing that in striking down the ban on marriage, courts 
implicitly validated the model of functional families put forth by other LGBT rights advocates 
seeking to achieve parental recognition outside of marriage). 
277. E.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 
(Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 1974). 
278. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612–15 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The universal 
definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman is no historical coincidence.”). 
279. Brief for Respondents at 3, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 
WL 648742, at *3.  Other examples include the Tenth Circuit brief in the post-Windsor challenge 
to marriage exclusions filed in Utah, in which the summary of argument stated: “Plaintiffs do not 
seek a new right to same-sex marriage. . . .  Plaintiffs seek the same freedom to marry enjoyed by all 
other Utah citizens.”  Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees at 16, Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th 
Cir. 2014) (No. 13-4178), 2014 WL 897509, at *16. 
280. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 271, at 43. 
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voting or the end of segregation at lunch counters changed eating in 
public.281 
The point arose in oral argument as well, in the following exchange between 
Mary Bonauto and Chief Justice Roberts: 
Bonauto: [H]ere we have a whole class of people who are denied the 
equal right to be able to join in this very extensive government institution 
that provides protection for families. 
CJR: Well, you say join in the institution.  The argument on the other 
side is that they’re seeking to redefine the institution. . . . [I]f you suc-
ceed, that core [historical] definition will no longer be operable. 
Bonauto: I hope not, Your Honor, because of what we’re really talking 
about here is a class of people who are, by State laws, excluded from 
being able to participate . . . . 
CJR: No.  My question is, you’re not seeking to join the institution, 
you’re seeking to change what the institution is.  The fundamental 
core of the institution is the opposite-sex relationship . . . .282 
The genuine question here is not whether tens of thousands of couples 
would decide to marry because they were driven by a sleeper cell mentality 
focused on attacking the beachhead of traditional marriage.283  What the join-
versus-change theme occludes by its superficiality is whether or the extent to 
which same-sex marriage will deepen or accelerate the demographic changes in 
the institution that are already occurring.284  As Robin West describes the changes 
that have already occurred as transformative: 
The content of [contemporary] marriage is discretionary.  
The . . . partners author it themselves—they produce the mar-
riage. . .  The institution of marriage does not, any longer, produce 
“husbands” and “wives.”  Rather, husbands and wives produce mar-
riages, and of a wide variety of forms.285 
The question of whether same-sex spouses will produce yet greater variety in the 
form of marriage is still on the table, and it is an important one for the political 
and social meanings, not the legal definition, of marriage. 
  
281. Id. at 64. 
282. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 256, at 5–6. 
283. When surveyed, same-sex couples give a variety of reasons for wanting to marry.  KATHLEEN E. 
HULL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE AND LAW 14–15, 200–
01 (2006). 
284. See Nan D. Hunter, The Future Impact of Same-Sex Marriage: More Questions Than Answers, 100 
GEO. L.J. 1855 (2012). 
285. ROBIN WEST, MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY AND GENDER 19 (2007). 
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D. Summary 
All of these discursive overlaps with constitutional doctrine carry more 
weight in a liberty analysis than an analysis focused on equality.  All tend to put 
the institution, rather than the exclusion, at the center of the discussion.  Thus it 
should be no surprise that the Obergefell opinion is primarily grounded in due 
process and liberty concepts, as were both Windsor and Lawrence, in contrast to 
the dominance of equality doctrine in Loving.286  The near absence of Equal 
Protection Clause reasoning suggests a degree of discomfort with invalidating 
discrimination against all persons in the excluded group. 
V. CULTURAL INTEREST CONVERGENCE 
Derrick Bell’s insight that social and political gains for disadvantaged 
minorities are unlikely to occur unless the dominant majority perceives those 
gains to be in their self-interest has become one of the most powerful precepts in 
critical race theory.287  It has been applied to many social justice efforts other than 
race,288 including to the LGBT rights movement generally289 and the marriage 
equality campaign specifically.290  With regard to marriage equality, the domi-
nant interests being served are not necessarily material or political in the tradi-
tional sense, as in the case of other movements.  Marriage as a resource is not 
susceptible to the pressures of scarcity, nor are its benefits valuable only to a small 
number of privileged persons.  Rather, the convergence is primarily cultural and 
discursive.291 
The processes for changing law and changing culture both involve the 
construction of meanings and of forging new conceptual paths for understanding 
  
286. As Courtney Joslin reminds us: “The editors of the Harvard Law Review . . . wrote in 1980: ‘the 
Loving opinion stopped short of a clear statement of a right to marry in Loving, for the reasoning 
depended largely on the racial character of the classification.”  Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights 
Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage, 97 BOSTON U. L. REV. 425, 456 (2017) (quoting 
Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1249 (1980)). 
287. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). 
288. Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 154–55 (2011). 
289. E.g., Anthony Michael Kreis, Gay Gentrificaton: Whitewashed Fictions of LGBT Privilege and the 
New Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 31 L. & INEQ. 117 (2012). 
290. E.g., Neo Khuu, Comment, Obergefell v. Hodges: Kinship Formation, Interest Convergence, and the 
Future of LGBTQ Rights, 64 UCLA L. REV. 184 (2017). 
291. Business interests also came to support a pro-equality position as part of their diversity campaigns 
and outreach to labor markets and consumers.  See Richard Socarides, Corporate America’s Evolution 
on L.G.B.T. Rights, NEW YORKER (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/business/ 
currency/corporate-americas-evolution-on-l-g-b-t-rights [https://perma.cc/WR2M-9NXC]. 
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our society, our places in it, and the consequences of our normative commit-
ments.292  Interactions between law and culture prod us to generate new versions 
of “the stories we tell ourselves about who we are.”293 
Analyzing interest convergence in the realm of culture raises questions that 
differ from those most relevant to struggles over more concrete interests.  As a 
point of comparison, one powerful reason why the interests of some U.S. political 
elites reinforced and enabled successes of the civil rights movement was the need 
during the Cold War to refute criticism of American capitalism as racist, in 
competing with the Soviet Union to win allies in newly independent nations in 
Asia and Africa.294  Although recognition of LGBT rights may signal cultural 
cosmopolitanism, a valuable commodity in the increasingly globalized economy, 
it does not carry the same kind of national security implications as does racial 
equality. 
Focusing on the cultural realm illuminates other dimensions of convergence 
that have been less frequently analyzed in prior scholarship, but are nonetheless 
important.  Bell’s original critique, for example, called out civil rights lawyers for 
failing to understand how invested certain white elites were in ending segregation 
in the South.  But Bell did not imply that the NAACP lawyers joined in arguing 
this point.  The discursive strategies developed and deployed by the marriage 
equality campaign, on the other hand, raise issues of intentional strategy more 
than oversight. 
The question of whose interests are in play also differs when cultural, rather 
than material, interests converge.  Bell’s argument points to specific elite groups 
among both African Americans and whites who had much to gain in tangible 
ways from integration.  The issue is more complex for marriage.  Although there 
is no definitive measure of support among LGBT Americans for according top 
priority to marriage as the movement’s primary goal, there is no question that the 
support was widely shared.295  The universalist premise of access to marriage 
  
292. Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 42 (2001). 
293. Robin West, Constitutional Culture or Ordinary Politics: A Reply to Reva Siegel, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
1465, 1484 (2006). 
294. See Derrick A. Bell, Racial Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current Conditions, 52 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 5, 12 (1976).  The amicus brief on behalf of the United States in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), argued that “[r]acial discrimination furnishes grist for the 
Communist propaganda mills.”  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Brown, 347 
U.S. 483 (No. 1), 1952 WL 82045, at *6, quoted in Bell, supra, at 12 n.30.  Bell’s identification of 
this factor became the kernel of a book: MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE 
AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000). 
295. Kathleen E. Hull and Timothy A. Ortyl, Same-Sex Marriage and Constituent Perceptions of the 
LGBT Rights Movement, in THE MARRYING KIND?, supra note 54, at 67, 87 fig.2.3; see also 
PATRICK J. EGAN ET AL., FINDINGS FROM THE HUNTER COLLEGE POLL OF LESBIANS, 
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and the emotional power of its cultural associations led to demonstrations and 
demands for equality in marriage that outstripped support within the LGBT 
constituency for other issues of equal treatment.  As blocking same-sex marriage 
grew more prominent among conservative causes, skeptics within the LGBT 
constituency recognized that it had become the leading litmus test for equal 
citizenship, whether they sought that or not. 
For the mass of non-gay supporters of marriage equality, there simply was 
no material gain or loss at stake.  Compare the marriage equality effort with the 
effort to prioritize more categories of family forms and to diminish the power of 
marriage as a monopolistic legal institution.  Contemporary cause campaigns fall 
into two broad categories: those that seek to represent the interests of a constitu-
ency and those that seek to press for structural change—a representation model 
and an ideological model.  Although the two are not mutually exclusive, identity 
group politics produces movements and campaigns that seek to win changes that 
advance the interests of a particular constituency, while the ideological group 
seeks change that moves the society toward greater adherence to a particular 
philosophy. 
The reason that the broader family reform effort did not achieve dominance 
as a movement strategy or produce its own campaign may be that it lacked the 
necessary mobilization potential.  The broader-than-marriage focus was less 
exciting within the LGBT constituency than a single issue drive to end the 
marriage exclusion, around which so much invective and emotion had clustered.  
At the same time, the goal of adding non-marriage options was insufficiently 
salient for sympathetic non-gay couples.296  Thus the goal of broader family law 
modernization and a de-emphasis of marriage did not have the support necessary 
to succeed under either a representation or ideological model (at least not yet). 
What was at stake for the movable middle was the preservation of cultural 
norms and traditional practices, even as the institution of marriage was being 
democratized around them.  In response, the Winning Marriage collaborators 
devised a strategy, based on cultural rather than logical principles of persuasion, 
  
GAYS AND BISEXUALS: NEW DISCOVERIES ABOUT IDENTITY, POLITICAL ATTITUDES, AND 
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT (2008), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/10af/dbc6036715c497938627dfb 
8d1642b60ef8f.pdf [https://perma.cc/P29R-TFF6] (reporting that slightly more than 50 percent 
of LGB respondents rated securing marriage rights as an extremely important issue for LGB 
persons); PEW RESEARCH CTR., A SURVEY OF LGBT AMERICANS: ATTITUDES, 
EXPERIENCES AND VALUES IN CHANGING TIMES 64–74 (2013) (finding that 74 percent of 
LGBT respondents strongly favored legalization of same-sex marriage but were less likely than 
other Americans to want to marry). 
296. Robin West argues that even for supportive heterosexual feminists, marriage as an institution that 
can be reinvented by each couple often just “works.”  WEST, supra note 285, at 140. 
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that was designed to reassure moderate voters that these norms and practices 
were not being threatened.  The opponents’ argument was that different-sex 
couples would be less likely to marry if the exclusion of same-sex couples ended.  
Not only did this claim lack any form of support—cultural, logical or empirical—
but it was implausible to the point of absurdity.297 
In their reconstruction of difference and sameness arguments, marriage 
equality advocates were dancing on the thin line that separates a claim for equal 
respect from a plea for respectability.  Seeking “to join marriage” implicitly refuted 
the stereotypes of hypersexuality associated with gay men, and required silence as 
to the possibility that same-sex partners would “produce marriages” in ways that 
would be significantly or visibly different from the traditional image of the 
institution. 
In these ways, marriage equality advocates enlisted in, or were swept into, a 
broader respectability politics, a term coined by historian Evelyn Higginbotham 
in describing the efforts of African American churchwomen roughly a hundred 
years ago.298  Higginbotham analyzed respectability discourse as combining 
elements of racial uplift, social conformity, community self-policing, and protest 
of injustice.299  The implicit contrast between a more modest and pragmatic 
response to systemic racism and a vision of liberation remains acute in African 
American politics,300 and it is not difficult to see an analogy in the debates over 
marriage within the LGBT community.  In both contexts, respectability is 
marked by the vision of households characterized by economic self-sufficiency 
and marital procreation, with an absence of other socially visible sexuality.  Using 
Cathy Cohen’s theory of patterns of marginalization,301 ending the marriage 
  
297. None of the dissenting opinions in Obergefell relied on it.  Justice Alito’s dissent could go only so far 
as to repeat his argument from Windsor that the future of marriage, if it included same-sex couples, 
contained unknowns.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642 (2015) (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
298. See generally EVELYN BROOKS HIGGINBOTHAM, RIGHTEOUS DISCONTENT: THE WOMEN’S 
MOVEMENT IN THE BLACK BAPTIST CHURCH, 1880–1920, at 185–87 (1993). 
299. Id. 
300. Compare, e.g., Fredrick C. Harris, The Rise of Respectability Politics, DISSENT, Winter 2014, at 33  
(criticizing President Obama and other African American politicians for placing too much 
emphasis on uplift and race-neutral politics), with Randall Kennedy, Lifting As We Climb: A 
Progressive Defense of Respectability Politics, HARPER’S MAG., Oct. 2015, at 24 (arguing that it is 
“an essential fact [that] any marginalized group should be attentive to how it is perceived”). 
301. CATHY J. COHEN, THE BOUNDARIES OF BLACKNESS: AIDS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF 
BLACK POLITICS 32–77 (1999) (postulating that there are four patterns of marginalization: 
categorical, integrative, advanced, and secondary). 
Varieties of Constitutional Experience 1725 
 
exclusion signaled the acceptance of gay presence in dominant institutions.302  
Although a “truly progressive step,” this form of marginalization is also contin-
gent on adoption of dominant norms.303  Securing it in turn produces “secondary 
marginalization,” in which more privileged members of marginal groups exercise 
various forms of power over less privileged members, such as those who do not 
meet the metrics for respectability.304 
This is not to argue that all marriage equality supporters, or all same-sex 
couples who have married, experienced the issue as chiefly one of respectability.  
Marriages and other ceremonies may symbolize and perform a political demand 
for an expansion of rights at the same time that they incorporate more traditional 
customs.  In her study of commitment ceremonies before marriage was legal, 
sociologist Kathleen Hull concluded that the ceremonies signified a transfer of 
cultural power to the couples involved, and therefore constituted “a form of political 
resistance even if not self-consciously political.”305  Same-sex marriage remained 
both radical and conservative to the end. 
CONCLUSION 
Social movement actors confront a complex polycentric force field of power 
and must navigate the constraints of the broader political context.  If one believes 
that the campaign to win same-sex marriage could have been more radically 
liberatory in its conception of constitutional equality, one has to look beyond 
internal structural questions about the campaign itself.  Like the early twentieth 
century labor movement, one has to understand “what lessons from the arenas of 
politics, lawmaking, and social reform, and what engagements with state policy 
and state power” produced the suppression of instincts for more radical change.306  
The paradox of popular constitutionalism is that its grassroots, bottom-up 
focus—exemplified in the impact of the ballot question elections on the marriage 
equality effort—may drive a movement or campaign to adopt a safer, more 
conservative discursive strategy than [progressives] would wish. 
  
302. See id. at 63 (“Advanced marginalization signals at the very least a symbolic opening of dominant 
society.  Where once formal exclusion was the law of the land, legal segregation and institutional 
subordination of marginal groups is removed under advanced marginalization.”). 
303. Id. 
304. Id. at 70–73. 
305. HULL, supra note 283, at 199. 
306. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 4 
(1991). 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges307 did not change the 
legal meaning of marriage, but it did signal that a change had occurred in its 
social meaning.  The contestation over LGBT rights, especially marriage, within 
the venues of direct democracy—specifically ballot questions—and the outcomes 
secured through the combination of direct democracy and the judiciary were 
essential to that change.  Although there were many more losses than victories in 
elections framed around LGBT equality, the battles also led to innovations in the 
forms and strategies for collective action in the realm of litigation. 
The dynamics of direct democracy changed the debates over same-sex mar-
riage in ways that narrowed the channels of argument into more traditional and 
conservative terms.  One caution for progressive popular constitutionalists who 
seek to redirect power away from courts may simply be the aphorism to be careful 
what you wish for.  For the marriage equality campaign, the result was success in 
achieving its goal of marriage equality, but with a troublesome political valence 
embedded in the outcome. 
After several decades of seeking heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation 
classifications, LGBT rights litigators won what had seemed their least possible 
victory without securing recognition that antigay discrimination was constitu-
tionally suspicious.  Doctrinally, if not politically, securing access for same-sex 
couples to marriage was a modest step, the extension of what has long been rec-
ognized as a fundamental right.  That it was modest does not mean that it was 
easy.  What remains unsettling about the constitutional import of Obergefell is its 
subordination of equality to liberty analysis through a jurisprudence of sameness.  
This, perhaps, is what passes for civil rights in a post-civil rights world. 
  
307. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
